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Book Reviews
Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We
Should and How We Can
by Michael McFaul
Reviewed by John Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs Officer
at the US State Department

M

ichael McFaul, Stanford professor of political
science currently serving as Senior Director for
Lanham, MD:
Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security
Rowan & Littlefield
Council, has written a cogent case for the proposiPublishers Inc., 2010
tion that people around the world would be better off
284 pages
under democracy and that promoting democracy serves
$27.95
American interests. In lucid prose free of social science
jargon, McFaul aims to rescue democracy promotion from the disrepute
it incurred under George W. Bush’s Administration, arguing that with the
right policies the United State should and can make democracy promotion a
cardinal principle of our foreign policy.
McFaul puts forward a minimalist definition of democracy as “electoral democracy,” that is, a system where leaders are chosen by all citizens in
competitive elections. Yet democracy, simply, merely allows majority rule over
the minority. McFaul concedes that head-counting alone will not secure the
political components of the “liberal democracy” he intends (e.g., constraints
on executive power by other independent branches of government, freedom for
all groups to express their interests and contest elections, independent associations and channels of expression, equality under the rule of law, an autonomous
judiciary). McFaul seems to presume that “electoral democracy” will produce
the blessings of “liberal democracy” instead of the ability of 51 percent of the
people to eat the other 49 percent, a point to which we shall return.
The utilitarian standard of the greatest good for the greatest number
underpins McFaul’s brief for democracy. Democratic government, he maintains,
“benefits the populace more than any other system.” It is accountable, correctible,
more conducive to individual freedoms, and more apt to produce competent
leaders than autocracy. Moreover, democracies better foster economic growth,
stability, and peace (at least with other democracies) than autocracies.
Expanding democracy would make the world a better place, McFaul
believes; that, however, is not America’s purpose. The author contends that
enlightened self-interest commends democracy promotion because it serves
US security and prosperity. History demonstrates that the internal character
of foreign regimes affects American interests; all our enemies have been
autocracies. Conversely, not all autocracies have been enemies of the United
States; yet McFaul judges that the long-term liabilities outweigh the shortterm security gains made by collaborating with autocracies (e.g., Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan). No democracy has been our enemy, on the other hand, and
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democracy’s expansion has enriched us. Promoting its spread would strengthen
America and put us on the right side of world opinion. In a flight of fancy,
the author envisions democratization extending to the Middle East and Asia,
including Russia, China, even the Hermit Kingdom of North Korea. “Sound
fanciful?” McFaul asks, “No crazier than dreaming the same for Europe in
1948.” This, despite the fact that not a shred of the liberal-democratic tradition
has marked the political cultures and histories of those countries.
If the goal of global democracy is grandiose, the practical measures
McFaul sets forth to implement it are limited and achievable. America should
eschew “regime change,” encouraging instead incremental political liberalization and helping to consolidate democracy where it has already taken root.
The United States should support civil society nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), condition US aid on domestic reforms, promote trade liberalization,
and work with multinational organizations committed to democratic norms.
McFaul’s policy agenda is similar to the “neoliberal foreign policy” advocated by Ambassador Dennis Ross, currently Senior Director for the Central
Region at the National Security Council (NSC), in his book, Statecraft. Ross
proposes that the United States assist gradual political liberalization without
forcing premature democratic processes. Ross would avoid the now-jaded term
“democracy” altogether in favor of modest reforms in good governance, combating corruption, and respect for minority and women’s rights.
This meliorist approach was taken by Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton during her July trip to Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Georgia. The theme of Clinton’s trip was democratic promotion, and in a
speech (crafted, we can assume, by McFaul) to the Community of Democracies
in Krakow, Clinton stressed the importance of civil society in building the sinews
of representative government and free markets. Noting the recent assault on
NGOs by autocratic regimes, Clinton offered cooperative steps and US financial support for embattled NGOs. “Democratic values,” she proclaimed, “are a
cornerstone of our foreign policy.”
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men,” James Madison wrote, “the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.” McFaul’s minimalist “electoral democracy” will not create the
“liberal democracy” he desires. For that “auxiliary precautions” are necessary.
Popular rule, the Founders understood, offers no guarantee of decent, stable,
effective self-government. McFaul wants to give voice to the people of the
world. Our Founders sought to temper and refine the peoples’ voice. Majority
rule by itself provides no check on a bad or foolish majority. To secure that end
the Framers devised a democratic-republic with an elaborate system of checks
and balances to divide and limit power to safeguard individual liberty. McFaul
rightly warns that the Anglo-American concern with individual liberty may not
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be suitable for different political cultures. He does not draw the implication that
decent, stable, effective self-government may not be feasible for most peoples.
Political culture matters above all else. Missing from McFaul’s account
of democracy’s prospects is recognition of how the vastly different political
cultures of peoples—their collective beliefs, values, habits—shape the kind of
polity they are capable of. McFaul claims the argument that certain prerequisites (e.g., liberal institutions, the rule of law, literacy, absence of widespread
poverty) are necessary for successful democratic development is true only “in
the extreme” without explaining why. He states the people of the world want
democracy now, bringing to mind H. L. Mencken’s quip that “democracy is the
theory that the common people know what they want and deserve to get it good
and hard.” Nearly all the democracies in the world cited by McFaul lack a trackrecord. The Anglo-American community represents the only long-standing
success of liberal-democracy in the world, a long, arduous struggle beginning
with the Magna Carta. When the Americans made their revolution, they did
so in the name of the traditional rights of British citizens, who had the benefit
of a century and a half of practical self-government during a period of benign
imperial neglect. McFaul dismisses Hong Kong and Singapore as exceptions to
the rule that liberalism does not evolve from autocracy, alluding to the fact that
those policies were the legatees of a British colonial tradition that bequeathed
to them a legacy of the rule of law, civil liberties, and honest administration.
In an insightful essay explaining the connection between culture and
the values and habits conducive to democratic governance, Lawrence Harrison
shows that not all cultures are equal and that few, least of all in the Muslim
world, match the Anglo-Protestant culture for fostering viable self-government.
Reflecting on the causes which maintain the American democratic-republic,
Alexis deTocqueville cited, in addition to material factors such as general prosperity, above all the political culture of the Anglo-Americans: “The laws and
customs of the Anglo-Americans are therefore that special and predominant
cause of their greatness which is the object of my inquiry.” Beyond the good
fortune of physical circumstances and well-adapted laws, Americans’ customs
accounted for their success: “Almost all the inhabitants of the territory of the
Union are the descendants of a common stock; they speak the same language,
they worship God in the same manner, they are affected by the same physical
causes, and they obey the same laws.”
Global democracy promotion underestimates the uniqueness of the
Anglo-American experience and lacks a sense of limits essential to a prudent
American foreign policy. McFaul is at pains to distinguish his policy from
that of the George W. Bush Administration; nonetheless, McFauls’ project
shares the missionary zeal of Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational
diplomacy,” a grand design to “change the world itself” by constructing an
international order reflecting American values. Secretary of State James Baker’s
table of “Ten Commandments” reminds us that values are not the only thing in
foreign policy and that “stability” is “not a dirty word.” Foreign policy cannot
be conducted according to the principles of Mother Teresa. “Foreign policy
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is not social work,” Baker notes. In the lives of nations nothing is forever;
national interests, however, must be secured in the present and near-term, inevitably requiring compromise and trade-offs. Secretary Clinton recognized this
in her visit to Azerbaijan, where she muted her democratic reform message in
deference to Azerbaijan’s strategic importance as a transit route to Afghanistan.
If the spread of democracy is unlikely to cast autocracies into the
dustbin of history along with slavery and imperialism, as McFaul hopes, assisting gradual political liberalization abroad could ameliorate the lot of peoples in
developing countries. McFaul sometimes conveys the impression that shoving
bad autocracies off the path of history is all that needs to be done to let a
thousand democratic flowers bloom. Responsible self-government, though, is
hard to establish, harder still to maintain. The story goes that a lady approached
Ben Franklin on a Philadelphia street outside the Constitutional Convention,
asking, “Mr. Franklin, what have you given us?” Franklin replied, “a republic,
madam, if you can keep it.” When Tocqueville surveyed the American scene,
he was struck by the wide array of private associations and groups that supplied the life-blood of the democratic-republic. What do Americans typically
do when confronting a problem? They form a group to solve it! Quietly and
unobtrusively supporting the elements of civil society abroad—labor unions,
consumer and environmental groups, women’s and human rights groups, business associations, media outlets, government watch-groups, and the like—not
only can improve peoples’ lives, but, most crucially, give them practice in the
art of self-government. Lincoln thought the capacity of men to govern themselves “a problematical proposition.” It remains so today.
Submission Guidelines
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The Grand Design: Strategy and
the U.S. Civil War
Courtesy of Oxford Univ. Press

by Donald Stoker
Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., Professor
of Military History, US Army War College

I

n the introduction to The Grand Design, Donald
Stoker, Professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval
New York: Oxford
Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California, promises
Univ. Press, 2010
the
first
book
on military strategy in the US Civil War.
528 pages
The claim of first is seriously debatable, but initiating that
$27.95
debate would not be useful. The better question for this
review is whether The Grand Design is truly a book on
Civil War strategy. Strategy has acquired such an expansive definition it may be
that Stoker has written a very good operational level history of the war. Much
strategic and occasionally grand strategic discussion creeps in, but the operational story dominates the narrative. This is to some extent natural, and Stoker
acknowledges the allure of the story; he consciously avoids battle narratives
and concentrates on campaigns, but that only gets him to the operational level
of war. The fact he discusses both theaters and more naval operations than is
common gives the book some strategic credentials, and the modern use of the
term “theater strategy” as an acceptable substitute for what is usually campaign
planning adds cachet. Nevertheless, this is not primarily a strategic study.
For a book on strategy, Stoker ignores or underplays some key strategic issues. He does not deal with the fast-war, single, decisive battle strategy
that dominated thinking on both sides in the Spring of 1861. It was a classic
response to civil unrest—the Romans traditionally attacked immediately to try
to squelch a rebellion before it really got going. Only if that failed did they bring
in large numbers of trained troops to crush what was almost certainly a major
uprising. The Union was entirely justified in attempting a similar approach, and
the South in trying to counter it. Stoker also does not deal with the undeniable
issue that it became obvious very early in the war that the eastern theater was
the decisive theater. Lincoln’s famous comment about not getting credit for the
North’s extensive gains in the west is instructive, and it was an issue for both
sides. Stoker discusses the border-states issue, but because it was largely a political problem does not really flesh out (other than explaining their importance
for both sides) the strategic maneuvering that kept them in the Union—a result
that was arguably decisive for the eventual outcome of the conflict. Although
he frequently mentions supposed Union sympathy in the South, he does not
explore in much depth how that influenced Union strategy except in the case of
eastern Tennessee (where it admittedly had the most significant impact).
Similarly, Stoker does not really deal with some of the modern strategic analysis of the war. For example, there is a very influential interpretation
of Union strategy that essentially runs—Lincoln was a natural strategist who
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learned as he went along. He identified fairly early a winning strategy of
concentric pressure by overwhelming Union force to crush the Confederacy.
His problem was that he did not have generals willing (McClellan) or capable
(Banks, Burnside, etc.) of executing the strategy until the team of Grant and
Sherman emerged. Lincoln could not fire many of his generals (for political
reasons) until after his reelection in 1864, so the war dragged on waiting for
competent leaders to execute the strategy. Stoker probably does not buy that
argument; he would have done well to address it directly.
The author never deals with the basic issue of how people thought
they were going to win the war—the most basic of all strategic questions. For
example, he points out that Robert E. Lee in a letter in 1862 wrote that nothing
but a political “revolution” from within would beat the Union, and that the
South’s only way to produce such a revolution was by achieving “systematic
success.” That is key to understanding what Lee did operationally. He kept
trying to provide those successive battlefield victories that would erode Union
political support for the war. Because Stoker does not accept that rationale, and
because he knows the outcome, he criticizes the strategic thinking behind the
Gettysburg campaign. If one accepts Lee’s strategic mind, not only does the
Gettysburg campaign make sense, but the successive tactical attacks on that
battlefield do too—Lee was trying to win a war, and he was willing to take
huge risks to achieve that goal. Stoker claims a victory at Gettysburg would
only have given Lee a win in the North, not a win in the war; however, that is
counterfactual and thus pure supposition. Stoker cannot know that any more
than Lee could.
Stoker knows of the ends-ways-means paradigm, but does not use it
to structure his examination of strategy. In fact, he sets up excellent opportunities and then lets them slip away. For example, he cites Jefferson Davis’s
inaugural address where the Confederate president laid out a classic endsmeans mismatch, but that does not lead to a discussion of potential options to
address the issue. This is perhaps most troubling because Stoker is very critical
of Confederate strategy. He recognizes the initial problem of trying to defend
everything was a political necessity. He sees the issue of too little force for
the space (especially in the west) that plagued Southern strategy and argues
against a cordon defense. He also argues, this reviewer believes unconvincingly, against the existence of a Confederate offensive-defensive strategy. He
criticizes the constant call for concentration of forces, which directly reflected
the strategic theory of Jomini all the leaders had learned, and he criticizes the
departmental organization that decentralized control of the war. However, he
does not offer an alternative Confederate strategy, although it would apparently have involved concentration of forces somewhere for some purpose and
centralized control from Richmond. At the most basic level, Stoker fails to do
exactly what he criticizes the strategists of the day for failing to do—propose a
set of objectives, resources, and concepts of employment that might be able to
achieve victory with an acceptable level of risk.
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Less seriously, Stoker does not seem to understand the 19th century
philosophy of command. He repeatedly criticizes generals and politicians for
not specifically ordering their subordinates to act. The practice at the time was
to acknowledge that the commander on the ground had a better understanding
of his situation than a commander far removed from the action. The issuer of
orders normally gave the subordinate discretion to use his judgment should the
conditions differ from what the superior understood. Under that system, one
should not expect direct and inflexible orders and should criticize the subordinate for failing to act, not the superior for failing to order. The superior deserves
criticism only for failing to remove a subordinate when a problem developed
or he abused the trust placed in him. Several Civil War commanders on both
sides fit that category, and Stoker should have been advocating their removal,
not their more decisive ordering.
To be fair, Stoker knows his business, and The Grand Design contains
several instances of excellent strategic analysis—for example his analysis
of Union strategy in the last half of 1863, which criticizes the North for not
continuing to apply unremitting pressure on the South after the victories of
the summer, or his analysis of Grant’s eastern theater strategy in 1864, which
points out both the risks and benefits of an attrition strategy. Similarly, Stoker’s
concluding analysis of the strategic abilities of the respective leaders is generally good, although he slams Lee because he does not like the Gettysburg
campaign and belittles Lincoln’s strategic ability outside the political arena
(both serious underestimations).
In summary, a book on Civil War strategy should cover the debates and
decisions about what to do, how to do it, and with what resources. It should
be largely at the national level, and the explanations of what happened in the
field should be short paragraphs necessary only to provide background for the
next set of strategic questions or decisions. Stoker concentrates on the military
element of power—a reversion to an older sense of the word strategy that is not
particularly helpful. Ideally, a book on Civil War strategy should look at all the
elements of national power and provide detailed discussions of the alternate
approaches to financing the war, recruiting soldiers, equipping units, dealing
with foreign powers, handling the media, maintaining domestic political
support, etc., as well as fighting the campaigns. Some of that is in The Grand
Design—for example, the Confederacy’s Erlanger cotton loans is mentioned,
although Erlanger did not make the index, and the entire cotton issue consumes
only two pages of text—nonmilitary issues are just not the focus of the book.
Lest my strategic nitpicking leave the wrong impression, I actually
enjoyed the book. The Grand Design is an excellent military study of the Civil
War. It is well researched and written. It flows smoothly and keeps the reader’s
interest. It is critical of both sides, although there is a Monday-morningquarterbacking aspect that occasionally irks, and Stoker is not afraid to offer
controversial interpretations. I suspect the book will do well commercially, and
I recommend it to readers.
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Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration
Invaded Iraq
by Jeffrey Record
Reviewed by Robert Killebrew, COL (USA Retired),
who served in Special Forces and held a variety of planning and operational assignments during his 30-year
Army career

J

eff Record has had a long and distinguished career as a
military and political critic. In the 1980s, for example,
226 pages
he was a leading light in the “military reform” movement
$24.95
that advocated for, among other things, smaller, cheaper
airplanes like the F-16 instead of the F-15, a fact that is
suggestively ironic considering the F-15’s impressive history as a fighter and
Record’s present professorship at the US Air Force’s Air War College. Those
who follow his scholarship are familiar with his incisive, and sometimes razorsharp, style.
In Wanting War, Record goes after the now-public mass of mischaracterization and deceit that accompanied the push, under former President George
Bush, to go to war in Iraq. It is not a pretty picture. It is also, by now, fairly
well known. For example, we now know—have known— there was no solid
evidence of a link between Saddam and al Qaeda, although the Administration
went to considerable lengths to publicize one. Likewise, it is now common
knowledge that there was no plan for post-invasion Iraq—indeed, that was
known well before the invasion, to the consternation and perplexity of anyone
familiar with sound military planning procedures and even a faint sense of
reality. Looking back, one has to scratch one’s head that so many responsible,
dutiful, and highly educated military and political leaders walked so willingly
off this cliff.
The facts are so well known that Record’s book will contain no surprises to anyone familiar with the subject. A marginal note composed during
this review says “another pile-on book,” and so it can be taken. He seems to
have a particular burr about “the neoconservatives,” a type of political ideologue inside the Beltway given to wearing bow ties and horn-rimmed glasses
and who believed—perhaps they still do—that American power can be used
to advance good in the world. In fact, “neoconservative” is invoked so often
in the book that one might think Record believes that they constituted a dark
cabal out to destroy America, instead of people with whose political philosophy
Record disagrees. The author’s politics have occasionally leant to the left, so the
neocons would be ideological foes as well as lousy war planners. Vice President
Dick Cheney also comes in for a good pasting, and deservedly so—the emergence of a co-president and the office of the vice president as another pole
of executive power is one of the more troubling trends of recent government.
Record has special scorn for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and notes
Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books Inc., 2010
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that Rumsfeld’s careless, almost breezy approach to war negated sound US
strategic planning.
By going in fast, relatively light and blind to possible post-invasion
military requirements, Rumsfeld created a fundamental contradiction between
the war plan and the critical objectives of quickly securing Iraq’s WMD sites
and the provision of security necessary for Iraq’s political reconstruction.
Rumsfeld either did not understand the disconnect between his invasion plan
and the war’s political objective, or he did understand it and simply chose to
ignore it because he had no intention of prolonging the US military’s stay in
Iraq beyond the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In any case, he subverted President Bush’s purpose in Iraq.
Books of this genre are fast appearing, and will doubtless continue
to come; in retrospect, the early Bush Administration now looks hopelessly
incompetent, and critiquing the war is the academic equivalent of shooting
fish in a barrel. But a decent respect for very recent history requires readers
to remember—for all that the runup to the war now looks like a sad Laurel &
Hardy rerun—that Iraq and Saddam Hussein were the principal foreign-policy
problem bequeathed by the Clinton Administration to Bush, and in the short
period between Bush’s inauguration and 9/11, Hussein’s regime looked very
menacing indeed. The UN sanctions were failing, US aircraft patrolling the
no-fly zones were frequently attacking Iraqi air defense sites, and Saddam was
subsidizing the families of suicide bombers, having decided to make himself a
devout anti-Western Muslim after decades of relentless and cruel secularism.
This is no excuse for bungled policy and war-planning, but the more serious
question of whether the United States could have put Iraq on a back burner
after 9/11, or why America chose to fight a two-front war—the first being the
unfinished fight in Afghanistan—must wait another historian; for Dr. Record,
the answer is simple—“The war was, in short, about the arrogance of power,
an interpretation perfectly consistent with the realist theory of international
politics which holds, among other things, that power unbalanced is power
inevitably asserted.” The reader can be forgiven for wanting a better explanation of “inevitably.” In another chapter, the author calls for an “autopsy” of
the decision to invade Iraq, giving as precedent the bipartisan 9/11 investigation because, he says, “disastrous foreign policy mistakes, like fatal accidents,
mandate investigations.”
Record’s concluding chapter offers a series of insights on the use of
force. Many of his comments are no surprise: he critiques both the “WeinbergerPowell Doctrine” of overwhelming force as well as the US capability to fight
limited wars, and doubts that even the application of massive and rapid force
can guarantee strategic victory for the United States. He acknowledges that war
is uncertain, and correctly comments that “Only rarely do prewar exit strategies
get implemented,” and that “the American body politic has limited tolerance
for prolonged, costly, indecisive wars.” The author doubts the US military’s
commitment to counterinsurgency, on which he has previously written, and
suggests that in future, American leadership should think “more than twice”
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about entering prolonged conflict. It is a curiously deflating ending to a book
propelled by indignation and a sense of certitude about US affairs. Perhaps like
many of us, Dr. Record is confessing that he doesn’t have all the answers.
One attractive feature of Wanting War is the author’s insight into warfare
in general. A long and perceptive observer of strategic affairs, Record’s asides
and general observations on war sprinkle the book with thoughtful points, as
when he mentions that “strategy must deal first and foremost with the realities
of power (including, for the United States, the limits of its own power) . . . ” or
in another chapter, “ . . . elections, written constitutions and other democratic
institutions can and have been exploited by antidemocratic parties to achieve
power . . . Democracy may not turn out to be the cure for the political ills of
the Middle East but rather the vehicle on which political extremism rides to
power.” Record’s eloquence and experience, his long study of war, and his
insight into current events enliven a book that suffers from his evident rage at
duplicitous policy and botched planning.

Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead Man and
a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured
an Allied Victory
Courtesy of Harmony Books

by Ben Macintyre

New York: Harmony
Books, 2010

Reviewed by James R. Oman, COL (USA Retired),
Director, Senior Service College Fellowship Program,
Defense Acquisition University, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland

“

Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,” originally
written in the ancient Roman poet Horace’s Odes,
$25.99
cited by the author in Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead
Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an
Allied Victory, and inscribed as the epitaph on Glyndwr Michael’s headstone
this Latin phrase translates into “It is sweet and fitting to die for your country.”
It is ironic that Michael, while not dying for his country, as the author points
out, nonetheless, “ . . . had indeed given his life for his country, even if he had
been given no choice about it.”
This reviewer suspects that most readers have never heard of Glyndwr
Michael. Michael played an instrumental role in concealing the Allies true
strategic intentions during the decisive middle years of the Second World War.
Actually, Michael’s mortal remains, combined with the contents of his briefcase
chained to his body, and the many items placed in his wallet and on his person,
were all part of a grand strategic deception plan. A plan aimed at misleading
Hitler and other senior, influential German military leaders.
Author Ben Macintyre describes Michael’s role and much more as
he tells the “rest of the story” in Operation Mincemeat. This latest work is
extremely interesting, well written, and exhaustively researched. Macintyre is
400 pages
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an accomplished author with numerous publications, a columnist, and writer at
large who can easily be classified as a “skillful storyteller.” Macintyre’s work
supplements and rests upon the foundation provided by an earlier tome authored
by Ewen Montagu. Montagu’s work, The Man Who Never Was is more recognizable due to its longevity in print, greater readership, and subsequent movie.
Macintyre demonstrates his penchant for research as well as his investigatory proficiency as he tracks down Ewen Montagu’s son during the course
of his initial research and development of the story. Jeremy Montagu provided
Macintyre with access to his father’s once classified files that were untouched
for countless years. Using this source, the author develops numerous threads,
twists, and turns inherent in the multiple story lines and subplots that are
stranger than fiction. They are more akin to a detective novel.
Macintyre provides a superb context for the developing operation.
The Allies faced a strategic crossroads in January 1943 when they met at the
Casablanca Conference in French Morocco. As Roosevelt and Churchill contemplate the destruction of the Axis Powers in North Africa and the Third Reich
in its totality, they are faced with the challenge of determining where and when
the initial attack on Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” would take place.
Following a good deal of debate and deliberation, they reach a decision
to assault Europe from the South via the Mediterranean Sea. A cursory examination of the land masses surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea unmistakably
points to Sicily. The Allies plan envisions Sicily as a vital springboard for their
drive into Italy, fulfilling Churchill’s oft-stated goal of assaulting the Third
Reich by attacking through the “underbelly of Europe.”
One of the challenges facing the Allies in early 1943 was convincing
the German commanders in general and Hitler specifically that the next target
was anywhere but Sicily. From this inauspicious beginning sprang Operation
Mincemeat, one of the most creative, ambitious, and ultimately successful deception plans in history. Operation Mincemeat was comparable in significance and
complexity, albeit on a much smaller scale, to that of Operation Fortitude, the
subsequent strategic deception plan that concealed the true location of D-Day.
Macintyre introduces the reader to a diverse group of individuals
that includes many memorable figures. Most notably is Acting Lieutenant
Commander Ewen Montagu. Recognized by the head of Naval Intelligence for
his terrific intellect, Montagu is the main character and the principal driving
force in developing, coordinating, and shepherding Operation Mincemeat to
fruition. Montagu’s primary assistant is Royal Air Force Flight Lieutenant
Cholmondeley. Cholmondeley is described as an unconventional intelligence
officer with a brilliant, creative mind. He plays a supporting yet significant
role throughout the operation. Other supporting members make their entrance,
play their part as the operation evolves, and move to the background, although
a number of participants reappear throughout the book. Whether it is Admiral
Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence and his assistant Lieutenant
Commander Ian Fleming (the future creator of James Bond), both highly adept
in deceiving their adversaries; or the noted pathologist Sir Bernard Spilsbury
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(who serves as a key advisor for the operation) or his colleague, Dr. Bentley
Purchase, who, as the coroner for the St. Pancras mortuary, “bent the rules” to
obtain an unclaimed, once nameless corpse (Glyndwr Michael) that masquerades as a courier lost at sea.
All of these individuals, plus a number of key players, do their part
in making a fantasy become plausible in the eyes and minds of their enemy.
Undeniably, the successful invasion and seizure of Sicily in the summer of
1943, with its lower than expected casualty figure of 7,000 deaths out of an
invasion force of 160,000 participants, can readily be traced to the successful
execution of Operation Mincemeat.
The author has again vividly demonstrated that the topic of World War
II remains a rich subject with an enormous number of stories yet to be told.
While numerous books and articles have been written on strategic deception
operations in World War II, Macintyre’s Operation Mincemeat: How a Dead
Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis and Assured an Allied Victory is an
invaluable addition to this genre and one offering fresh insight.
Macintyre’s work clearly provides a cautionary note to today’s strategic
leaders and illustrates the importance of understanding one’s enemy, of properly
interpreting intelligence, and the timeless relevancy of strategic deception. It is
important that today’s strategic leaders be proficient in readily distinguishing
between fact, fiction, and deception.

A History of Air Warfare
Courtesy of Potomac Books Inc.

edited by John Andreas Olsen
Reviewed by Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of
Research, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College

T

his anthology is a welcome addition to any library
responsible for keeping an up-to-date collection of
works addressing the history of warfare. The editor, John
Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books Inc., 2010
Andreas Olsen, has put together an exceedingly useful
volume of 16 essays covering the history of air operations
488 pages
from the Great War to the Second Lebanon War (2006).
$35.00
Several of the chapters are written by some of the most
respected of air power’s historians: John H. Morrow Jr. covers the First
World War; Richard Overy has a chapter concerning the European theater of
the Second World War; Richard R. Muller takes up the air war in the Pacific;
Wayne Thompson examines air operations over North Vietnam (1965-1973);
Benjamin S. Lambeth discusses Operation Enduring Freedom (2001); James S.
Corum addresses air power’s role in small wars; and Richard P. Hallion offers
an essay arguing that technological advances have made air power essential, if
not decisive, and that moving into space is the next logical step in the evolution
of air power; this is an argument that air enthusiasts will surely embrace, but
one that land and naval proponents might challenge.

Summer 2011

89

Book Reviews

Several other luminaries whose expertise extends well beyond the
history of air power are also featured: Williamson Murray contributes an essay
on air power in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003); Martin van Creveld provides a
chapter on the rise and fall of air power; and Sir Lawrence Freedman addresses
air power in the Falklands War (1982). The views of scholars of such stature
are always welcome regardless of the topic. Martin van Creveld’s argument is
particularly noteworthy because it offers a balance to Hallion’s. Van Creveld
maintains that the trend toward unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs) combined with an increase in “low intensity conflict”
mean there is no longer a compelling case for an independent air service. These
two essays offer plenty of grist for debate.
In addition to these noted authorities, A History of Air Warfare also
features essays by several accomplished practitioners and former practitioners.
These consist of: Brigadier General Itai Brun of the Israeli Air Force (IAF),
who contributes a chapter on air power in the Second Lebanon War (2006);
Samuel L. Gordon of the IAF, who addresses air power in the Arab-Israeli
wars (1967-1982); Alan Stephens of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF),
who covers the air war over Korea (1950-1953); Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason
(Ret.) of the Royal Air Force (RAF), who assesses air power in Operation Allied
Force (1999); Robert C. Owen of the US Air Force, who explores the utility
of air power in Operation Deliberate Force (1995); and John Andreas Olsen of
the Norwegian Air Force, who examines air power in Operation Desert Storm
(1991). Brun’s essay is worthy of special note, as it is a balanced and detailed
case study of the 2006 campaign from the standpoint of air operations. He
does not dismiss the case for capable ground forces, but rather reinforces it,
highlighting the need for a coherent air operational doctrine that can close
the gap between contemporary political objectives and available air capabilities. Although some IAF leaders appear to have been taken with the theory of
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and the purported efficacy of a long-range
precision strike, Brun contends that the IAF did not have time to implement a
new air doctrine before 2006.
A History of Air Warfare provides a selection of sixteen case studies
that will be useful in any survey course on the history of warfare, or any course
concerning the history of air power operations. The authors took care to incorporate the latest scholarship in their respective chapters, and the essays as a
whole are well written. There is not a disappointing one in the lot. A History
of Air Warfare is thus useful for students, whether civilians or military professionals, interested in air power theory and operations or who are participating
in a formal education program concerning military strategy or defense studies.
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rom regional states where drought and food insecurity
place untenable demands on the political system to
288 pages
Africa, where oil recovery has created wastelands of arable
$27.00
land and given rise to insurgencies that are contributing to
the loss of over one million barrels a day in oil production,
environmental issues are creating instability and affecting America’s national
security. An exponential increase in global population has made resource issues
increasingly important, to the point they may become the deterministic variable.
Global Warring, by security expert and journalist Cleo Paskal, is a
“must read.” Divided into four sections, the book is a clearly written explanation of why the Director of National Intelligence included environmental
security and climate change in his 2009 threat brief to Congress. Global
Warring’s first section examines the West’s vulnerability to environmental
change and how nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom
are especially vulnerable to natural disasters. The second section examines the
importance of vital water transportation routes and choke points, demonstrating
how climactic change affects the geopolitical importance of these routes. The
third part is an analysis of the changing precipitation patterns and their impact
on various regions, with particular focus on China, India, and Russia. The final
section provides a particularly interesting perspective on rising sea levels and
geopolitics in the Western Pacific (e.g., the increase of Asian influence in the
world and particularly China’s increased influence in the Pacific region while
attempting to disenfranchise US influence there).
According to United Nations statistics over the past 60 years, at least 40
percent of all intrastate conflicts have been linked to natural resource exploitation. Thus, it was no surprise when on 12 February 2009, the US Director of
National Intelligence and former United States Pacific Command commander,
retired Admiral Dennis Blair, included environmental security and climate
change in the Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stating “Climate change, energy,
global health and environmental security are often intertwined, and while
not traditionally viewed as ‘threats’ to US national security, they will affect
Americans in major ways.” These environmental issues affect national security
and are an increasingly important element of 21st century geopolitical calculus.
A broad spectrum of security analysts, as well as those seeking to better
understand China’s geopolitical strategy, will also find the book intriguing. Paskal
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provides an in-depth view of China’s “Go Out” strategy (the Chinese government subsidizing private enterprises to expand outside China into resource rich
areas such as Central and South America
and Africa). She then examines effects of
this expansive strategy locally (on the host
. . . the author . . . offers
nation) and regionally, a truly comprehena common sense strategy
sive review. The author voices caution that,
to plan for and mitigate
left unchecked, nations such as China will
[climate change] effects.
create a monopoly on the natural resource
markets, rendering the US strategy of
depending on the “open market” in danger of becoming obsolete.
Climate change and changing precipitation patterns is another important
topic examined, and the author provides a short history of the origins of the study
of climate change and analyzes how scientific inroads gave rise to meteorological
offices in England and elsewhere. Paskal asserts “our environment is the foundation upon which we graft all other infrastructure. Our transportation systems,
cities, defensive capabilities, agriculture, power generation, water supply and
more are all designed for the specific parameters of our physical environment and
climate—or, more often, the physical environment and climate of the Victorian
or post Second World War periods in which they were originally built.”
Essentially, the author does not argue the cause of climate change,
but offers a common sense strategy to plan for and mitigate its effects. Her
analysis of the associated problems of changing weather patterns is spot on and
correctly correlates environmental instability to governmental legitimacy and
national and regional stability. For example, if a government is unable to supply
the population with basic needs, such as continued access to food and potable
water, there will be dire consequences as evidenced by 33 countries who faced
civil unrest because of high food prices in 2008.
Global Warring establishes a clear link between geopolitics, environmental issues, and regional stability. Unfortunately, societies have not adapted
to the environmental changes that have occurred during the last half century
and continue to maintain population centers close to shorelines, while failing to
build “climate proof” buildings and infrastructures. Perhaps, if enough policy
makers read Global Warring, governments may fully grasp the importance of
changing climates and precipitation patterns, and adopt measures to avoid or at
least recover more quickly from natural disasters.
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in Modern Warfare
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A

nthologies are neither easy to compile nor edit, especially in a fashion that provides a depth and breadth
of knowledge while minimizing overlaps and gaps in
458 pages
coverage. The case of Ideas as Weapons in that regard
$29.95
is a worthy attempt to capture thought on the increasing,
if not preeminent, importance of information in modern
warfare. Published in 2009, a complete reading of the book makes it clear that
most chapters are based on articles written prior to 2006. While this certainly
appears to date the content in what is still a nascent and emergent doctrinal
field, the material often reflects accurate and prescient facts, analysis, and recommendations that are as applicable today as when they were penned. The
practitioner of information in warfare will find himself nodding in agreement
most of the time, but there are also readings that will cause him to scratch his
head or disagree rather strongly. Given that dichotomy, a review of the book
is best approached by considering valuable overarching insight that supplants
individual chapters and recommending articles that provide the best insight into
information as it applies to today’s and future conflicts.
Ideas as Weapons is replete with important concepts inherent to the
successful application of information to military success. Counterinsurgency
is a recurring theme, entirely understandable considering the current nature of
conflict. The emphasis here is rightly on population-centric operations and the
importance of persuasion toward attitude and behavior change. The military’s
current definition of information operations is discussed and critically portrayed
as obfuscatory. There is a recurring call for ownership of the information aspects
of warfare by military commanders, recommending that they establish an intent
envisioning the information environment in light of military operations while
defining an appropriate information end state. Visual imagery’s lengthy declassification procedures are considered, this in line with the criticality of speed
in today’s information environment. Perhaps the most prevalent and recurring
message is the oft overlooked importance of actions in sending loud messages
that portend the role of all military members as information operators. Most
interesting in considering this array of topics is the fact that they have risen to
prominence over the course of the past four to five years, appearing increasingly in pre-doctrinal manuals and studies pointing to the prophetic nature of
their importance as presented here.
The editors have split the anthology into four sections: geopolitical, strategic, operational, and tactical. Do not be deceived by this somewhat artificial
Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books Inc., 2009
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breakout. Short of a few exceptions, it is more reflective of the level of discussion as opposed to the trend line in lessons learned. As Admiral Mike Mullen
notes, “The lines between strategic, operational, and tactical are blurred beyond
distinction” in today’s information environment. Having said that, it is worth
pointing out to the potential reader the chapters of significance where, short of
reading the entire book, one can get the most valuable insight.
Dr. Phillip Taylor offers a short but valuable chapter on “The Limits
of Information Strategies.” He states what may be obvious to many, that any
attempt to control the information environment at the strategic level will prove
futile. Still, Taylor offers that it is imperative to consider the information effects
of words and deeds as applied to multiple audiences, particularly in messages
that come from Washington. T. X. Hammes and William Darley follow with
previously published pieces that are well worth a first look, or a reread if applicable. Hammes, who is generally respected for his work on “4th Generation
Warfare” applies that same theory directly to information operations, deftly
pointing out flaws and providing relevant recommendations for fixes. Darley’s
“Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Information Operations” should appear on
the reading list of every senior military leader. It is strategically focused and
considers the full spectrum of military operations.
Religion is “the single most problematic, complicated, sensitive, volatile, and debated subject in the current Global War on Terrorism,” notes Pauletta
Otis in Chapter 19. Otis does not shy away from the subject and develops an
excellent contextual overview of religion as it impacts information in warfare.
There are several chapters that call upon history to apply lessons to the current
theaters of war. One of the best is “Estimates, Execution and Error . . .” where
Colonel Eric Walters uses Vietnam to glean lessons learned that can be directly
applied to ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Several other outstanding
chapters bear mention, including Metz’s “Massing Effects in the Information
Domain . . .” and Kilcullen’s “28 Articles . . .” both previously published and
widely read. The final “Tactical” section of the book is generally anecdotal in
nature and is a mixed bag in terms of quality of writing and content.
The editors conclude the book with a note that the anthology is meant
to provide a framework on which to build thinking as opposed to a checklist for how to proceed. Ideas as Weapons accomplishes its stated objective.
Information practitioners will find value in reading the entire book with a
critical eye in an effort to learn, reinforce their own knowledge, or consider
the perspectives from different viewpoints. The layperson will not, and should
not, read the entire book. The breadth and depth of coverage for an interested
novice may well prove laborious. Instead, focus on the chapters recommended
in this review; they provide insight and critical analyses on both the challenges
and opportunities reflective of the book’s subtitle: Influence and Perception in
Modern Warfare.
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Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue
American Foreign Policy
by Leslie H. Gelb
Reviewed by Joseph R. Cerami and Matthew Harber,
Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas
A&M University
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n Power Rules, Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus and
Board Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, sets
out
to bring back “common sense” to the US government’s
352 pages
exercise of power and its foreign policy decisionmaking.
$27.99
Gelb believes that, with a few modifications, American
leaders can utilize the fundamentals of power as described
by Niccolò Machiavelli in The Prince. Gelb’s advice is that by rethinking
Machiavelli, American power can be restored and effectively used to pursue
US national interests.
The author asserts that the problem for American policy makers today
is that the fundamental definition of power has been lost. According to Gelb,
the definition of power has been hijacked by the ideological debate between
liberals and conservatives and that whichever side wins this debate will control
American foreign policy and its future. As such, the rewards for winning the
battle over the definition of power are critical to each political party.
From the beginning of the book, Gelb refutes the ideas of other international affairs authors—Joseph Nye (smart power), Fareed Zakaria (the
post-American world), and Thomas Friedman (the world is flat)—and asserts
that power is power. Gelb sees no value in what he implies is faddish thinking about smart power, a flat world, or America’s decline in world politics. In
Gelb’s mind, there is only one kind of power, which is the capacity to get people
to do things that they normally would not want to do in the first place. In the
case of foreign policy, he portrays American power as the capacity to get other
states to follow the US lead and secure American strategic interests. The best
way to do this then is to simply use plain old American common sense. It is
here that one begins to see an inherent problem with Gelb’s overall argument.
The essential criticism is how can one create linkages between complex
issues and common sense? What would common sense look like in the 21st
century context, with American policy makers facing issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, cyber warfare, regional and ethnic
conflict, environmental and economic security, transnational crime, and so on?
To use one of Gelb’s examples of foreign policy driven by common sense
leaves the reader asking how “commonsensical” was Nixon and Kissinger’s
handling of Asia post-Vietnam. As Vietnam drew to an end, in a period of
American decline according to the then-conventional wisdom, Gelb argues that
Nixon and Kissinger correctly saw that an American defeat would potentially
cause America’s international power to atrophy. In order to prevent this, even
New York:
HarperCollins
Publishers, 2009
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with military defeat inevitable, Nixon and Kissinger developed a three-step
approach to preserve and even strengthen American power. First, Nixon and
Kissinger dramatically opened diplomatic channels with China. Second, they
signed an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union. Third, Nixon and Kissinger
negotiated the Yom Kippur War settlement between Israel and Egypt. This
three-step approach, far from what common sense or the conventional wisdom
would dictate, set the conditions internationally for the United States to retain
its influence as the only nation most adversaries were willing to work with.
Within Asia, most Asian countries became more dependent on the United States
because of their fear of a strong China. If this type of broad-ranging and transformative approach is highlighted as effective foreign policymaking by Gelb’s
own assessment, then no wonder common sense has appeared to be lacking
within the American foreign policy establishment (in all the Administrations
since Nixon in Gelb’s view).
Despite this clashing dichotomy between common sense and complex
21st century issues, Gelb does provide policy analyst and strategist a good starting point for thinking about foreign policy. The author’s approach is similar to
that of the Army War College in which students are encouraged to analyze the
“ends, ways, and means” as they develop their strategic thinking skills. Gelb
describes his approach as a similar thought process for setting achievable goals,
clarifying appropriate priorities, knowing one’s power sources, and sequencing
one’s “moves so as to effectively achieve one’s goals and priorities.” He also
advises that American policy makers must cease the following—denying there
are any limits to American power and assuming omnipotence (conservatives) or
embracing all the limits to American power and assuming impotence (liberals).
Again, as War College graduates first learned from Professor Lykke, this type
of approach is an excellent place to start. But it is a necessary but not sufficient
process for seeking to develop a deeper understanding of the complexity of 21st
Century world politics and policymaking.
Readers of Parameters can profitably utilize Gelb’s approach in their
reviews of the strengths and weaknesses of the Obama Administration’s current
National Security Strategy (NSS). Gelb’s framework is particularly useful for
its near-term insight. Does the current NSS set achievable goals? Are the priorities appropriate for the international environment? Are the power sources
identified? Do the expected sequences of activities appear likely to achieve the
administration’s goals? In the end, strategic thinking should follow a logical
pattern and, certainly, strategies require continual tuning.
Gelb’s foundational thinking about Machiavelli’s classic provides one
way to assess the utility and effectiveness of power as an instrument of statecraft. However well intentioned, calls for “common sense” by single-mindedly
focusing on power is simply too easy an approach for global leadership in
foreign and defense policy and strategy making in the complex and problemfilled post 9/11 world.

96Parameters

Victor Davis Hanson’s Makers of Ancient Strategy

Courtesy of Princeton Univ. Press

Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian
Wars to the Fall of Rome
edited by Victor Davis Hanson
Reviewed by Dr. John A. Bonin, General George C.
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n Makers of Ancient Strategy: from the Persian Wars
to the Fall of Rome, prolific historian Victor David
Hansen provides a prequel to the 1986 classic Makers of
Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.
278 pages
He joins a cohort of historians who have recently sought
$27.95
relevant insight to present conflicts from the sometimes
opaque accounts of how Greeks and Romans made strategy and wars in antiquity. Hansen is the Anderson Senior Fellow in Classics
and Military History at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and a syndicated columnist for Tribune Media Services. Much like its predecessor, most
of this volume’s contributors have written noteworthy accounts of aspects of
war, in this case the classical world.
What Hansen seeks in this anthology is to explore “the most ancient
examples of our heritage to frame questions of the most recent manifestations
of Western Warfare.” He argues that the classical world offers a unique ability
in understanding war in any era due to the unchanging human nature which
drives conflict. Hansen warns that, unlike the abstract thinkers who have made
modern strategy, ancient strategy is more often implicit in the empirical writings of the classical authors and requires more supposition. In addition, due
to the reduction of technological impact on strategy, the classical world offers
seemingly novel solutions which may assist current strategic leaders in making
better choices.
The book’s first six chapters are short and readable accounts of selected
aspects of the Greek wars. Tom Holland leads off with “From Persia with Love,”
which presents the Greco-Persian Wars of Herodotus from a fresh perspective
of the Persian Empire. The Greeks and their “Western Way of War” defeated the
“Persian Way of War” that relied on propaganda, turncoats, and a mass levy of
the empire’s subjects. The benefits of the early Athenian Empire in maintaining
security and fostering economic growth, before hubris and strategic overreach
doomed it, are analyzed by Donald Kagan in “Pericles, Thucydides, and the
Defense of Empire.” In one of the weakest chapters, David Berkey presents
“Why Fortifications Endure” with respect to the diverse economic, political,
and military agendas that led to the walls of Athens. In addition to serving
as the editor and preparing the introduction, Hansen presents a new perspective on a relevant, contemporary topic in describing the defeat of Sparta and
the spread of democratic governments by “Epaminodas the Theban and the
Doctrine of Preemptive War.” Ian Worthington follows with the cautionary case
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ.
Press, 2010

Summer 2011

97

Book Reviews

of “Alexander the Great, Nation-Building, and the Creation and Maintenance
of Empire.” This timely tale reviews the misleading ease of initial Western
military defeat of inferior indigenous forces with the difficulty of
The “Alexander the Great”
administering conquered lands with
case . . . reviews the misleading renewed and amorphous centers of
resistance. Completing the Greek
ease of initial Western military
section is a disappointing chapter
defeat . . . .
by John W. I. Lee, “Urban Warfare
in the Classical Greek World.” Not
only does he exclude numerous Roman examples of urban combat (Carthage,
Alesia, Jerusalem), but he stays at a tactical level and fails to adequately address
the issue of the strategic necessity of urban warfare.
The next four chapters focus on Roman warfare. Susan Mattern provides a thought-provoking perspective in “Counterinsurgency and the Enemies
of Rome.” She submits that Rome endured for a long time not only because of
overall military superiority and punitive operations, but because it offered social
and economic benefits to powerful elements in subject territories. Barry Stauss
in “Slave Wars of Greece and Rome” places the revolt of Spartacus and other
slave insurrections in a strategic context. He concludes that despite the terror
these servile insurgencies invoked, the insurgents were doomed to failure when
the state responded in all its armed might. Next, Adrian Goldsworthy presents a
distilled version of his larger work in “Julius Caesar and the General as State.”
Goldsworthy argues that Caesar’s greatness was irrevocably entwined with
his army, and that Caesar, by charismatically maintaining the army’s loyalty,
overrode its duty to the state. Peter Heather’s last chapter, “Holding the Line,”
presents his provocative view that Rome didn’t really collapse but, due to
Roman strategic policy, blended over time with the Barbarians.
Though the book is of high overall quality, Hansen as editor curiously
fails to remain focused on ancient strategy despite the name of the book. While
several of the chapters stray considerably from the strategic theme to focus more
on individuals, none cover some other famous classical strategists—Hannibal,
Scipio Africanus, Augustus, Trajan, or Marcus Aurelius. In addition, Hansen is
unabashed in focusing only on what he has written almost extensively about—
the Western Way of Warfare—not Asian or Middle Eastern ancient warfare;
he also shows a bias toward the Greeks rather than the Romans. Regardless,
Makers of Ancient Strategy is a must for readers interested in strategy during
antiquity or for a 21st Century perspective of the strategic parallels between
today and the classical Greeks and Romans.
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D

avid Ucko’s book perfectly captures the central
paradox in contemporary defense policymaking.
268 pages
According
to Ucko, in spite of almost a decade of irregular
$44.95
warfighting against various insurgent and terrorist actors,
“corporate level” DOD remains reluctant to institutionalize armed stabilization
and extended counterinsurgency (COIN) at the expense of or in addition to
preparation for more conventional conflicts.
Ucko’s central message? In the field, the US military has adapted to
COIN and broader irregular warfighting. Admittedly, however, this adaptation
was too slow, and, it was initially born of failure. Nonetheless, a decade of
hard experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in real in-stride military
innovation. Ucko’s key evidence pointing toward “business end” adaptation are
the 2006 COIN manual, written under General David Petraeus’ leadership, and
the implementation of COIN doctrine (again under Petraeus) in the now famous
Iraq War “surge”—dubbed Operation Fardh al-Qanoon. Ucko concludes,
however, that full or durable institutionalization of the hard-won lessons and
new capabilities emerging from Iraq are vulnerable to inherent DOD biases still
wedded to wars it prefers—conventional—versus wars it has—irregular.
Ucko does an excellent job outlining the policy and doctrine forensics
of the current state of play. In this respect, The New Counterinsurgency Era
provides solid history of the decade-long bureaucratic tug-of-war associated
with DOD’s adjustments to an expanding unconventional challenge set. Ucko
is on target when he places initial blame for policy-level resistance to stability operations (SO) and COIN on DOD’s general orientation under Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld. Senior defense officials from 2001 to 2006 sought to exploit
the US-dominated revolution in military affairs (RMA), pursuing wholesale
high-tech transformation regardless of the character of ongoing wars and what
those wars portend for the future.
At its roots, Rumsfeld’s defense revolution focused on precision war with
another state. It did not account for large-scale irregular warfights. Reality was not
to interrupt the RMA. To RMA adherents, COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan
were momentary abberations, insignificant in many respects to the growing
neoconventional threat from China and a host of would-be nuclear powers.
To the most ardent acolytes of defense “transformation,” the early
course of the Afghan and Iraq wars validated their world view, a vision where
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advanced technical capability and its inherent superiority ultimately mattered
more than mass. The Taliban was routed quickly as US firepower enabled the
Northern Alliance on the ground, while Saddam’s grip on Iraq collapsed a
mere three weeks after an under-sized, conventional US-led force drove up the
Tigris and Euphrates river valleys to unseat him. Ultimately, Ucko argues that
it was the insurgency emerging after regime change in Iraq that laid bare the
vulnerability of Rumsfeld’s transformation.
To be sure, Ucko takes more than Secretary Rumsfeld and the RMA
to task over the failure to institutionalize SO and COIN. He asserts that
greater adaptation to irregular warfighting was and remains at odds with a
powerful tsunami of countervailing forces— mostly emanating from inside the
Washington beltway. These forces range from overly conservative institutional
military leadership to defense industries relying on a “big war” narrative to
sell high-tech programs. The “iron triangle” that constitutes the US defense
community—DOD, Congress, and big US defense contractors—all had reasons
to resist greater adaptation. Thus, advocates of COIN were often themselves
“insurgents” in their own institutions.
Perhaps Ucko’s most biting criticism is saved for advocates of a special
forces (SF) or SF-like “indirect approach” to pressing irregular challenges.
According to Ucko, this group recognizes the need to adapt to irregular
warfighting but seeks to do so at very low visibility and cost, saving room inside
the defense program for traditional military challenges. Readers will find that
Ucko has tapped into a recent powerful Defense predilection that seeks to offset
the hazards associated with most unconventional challenges by either preventing
them outright or combating them through cultivating more capable partner
security forces worldwide. To Ucko and many others, the “indirect approach”—
like conventional deterrence and dissuasion—is clearly preferred, as it offsets
the broad costs of large-scale military operations. Building partner capacity
alone, however, does not obviate the need for general purpose forces that are
ready for direct intervention. Believing it does incurs enormous strategic risk.
In the end, Ucko plays into a common frustration among many COIN
and SO purists. That is, regardless of how jarring recent experience has been
and in spite of the exquisite quality of new doctrine and concepts based on that
experience, policy can and often will go in another direction. The military’s
reading—or in this case a segment of the military’s reading—of the future
strategic environment does not always conform to that of senior policy
makers. Military doctrine and concept developers account intellectually for
“all possible wars” at the operational level. Today’s wars—more appropriately
the US approach to them—will not always or even commonly look like our
response to tomorrow’s. And, regardless of the proven efficacy of a very
comprehensive COIN approach, there are clearly pitfalls. These are choices
made by future civilian decisionmakers after the best military advice—not by
COIN enthusiasts, concept developers, or doctrine writers.
In this regard, Ucko’s book is an important warning to senior civilian
and military leaders against hastily discarding essential national security tools.
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These same leaders, however, are the very people who ultimately decide where,
when, for what purpose, and toward what end the United States next employs
the military instrument. Clearly, a bounty of lessons on how to posture for and
conduct extended SO and COIN emerged from Iraq and Afghanistan. That does
not mean that those lessons are automatically universal, durable, or indelible.
Faced with a crippled domestic economy in the twilight of two expensive COIN
operations, the United States might well choose to address similar future threats
in a less costly manner. This may result in the pursuit of more limited strategic
objectives and, thus, a less expansive US investment.
Ucko is clearly correct. The next US war is far likelier to look like
Baghdad circa 2006 than Kuwait City circa 1991. What remains in doubt is
whether or not a US president—well aware of the enormous absolute costs of
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—will be circumspect in the objectives pursued,
by implication limiting the US effort in time, human capital, and material
resources. Or, if faced again with righting a failed regional power, he or she
chooses maximum stabilization, nation-building, and COIN. Prediction at this
point is impossible; however, there are good indications the former is preferred.

Global Security Watch: Kenya
by Donovan C. Chau

Courtesy of Praeger

Reviewed by Dr. Dan Henk, Director, Air Force Culture
and Language Center, Air University

T

his work is a recent addition to the Praeger Global
Security Watch series—publications that assess the
“strategic dimensions” of individual countries. The publisher makes bold claims, calling the book “an expert
Santa Barbara, CA:
Praeger, 2010
analysis . . . first to examine the strategic dimensions of
194 pages
Kenya and the political and military circumstances that
shaped the country.” The author more modestly claims that
$49.95
he seeks to “inform the general public, students, scholars
and policy makers in the United States.” The publication may not fully live up
to the advertiser’s hype but does achieve the author’s intent.
The author organized his text in a straightforward if somewhat
mechanical manner—an initial chapter provides the geographic and political
background to the country followed by a chapter examining the recent history
of the Kenyan Armed Forces. Chau then takes three chapters to analyze Kenya’s
security relationships with its neighbors (Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia) and
relations with the United States. Subthemes in these latter chapters include
Kenya’s connections to various other states and institutional actors, among
them the United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, Ethiopia, and the larger
East African and Horn of Africa communities. A final chapter concludes with
policy recommendations for Kenya and the United States.
No publication can be all things to all people, and reviewers are vulnerable to an arrogance that insists a work should reflect the reviewer’s (rather than
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the author’s) vision. So it is appropriate at the outset to note that this book is a
commendable addition to the existing literature, providing a useful summary
of Kenya’s contemporary external relations. The author is a seasoned analyst
who draws valuable insight from his professional experience and from extensive interviewing in support of his study. Of particular value is Chau’s analysis
of Kenya’s historically fraught relations both with neighboring Somalia and
the Somali societies of the Horn (among which are the ethnic Somalis who
happen to be Kenyan citizens). The chapter outlining US-Kenya relations since
the 1970s also is worthy of note—filling a somewhat overlooked niche in the
literature. These strengths make the book a useful addition to the library of
an Africanist scholar and of value to policy makers concerned with security
dynamics in East Africa and the Horn. The book may be most useful as an
introduction for readers with a limited background in East African studies.
The work does have some limitations. The most significant, at least
to this reviewer, is a deficiency within the literary genre itself—the tendency
to reification. Nation-states are abstractions that cannot think, decide, or act.
While it is conventional and convenient to attribute such capabilities to them,
that practice obscures the fact that policy decisions are made by sentient beings,
in many cases by a few individuals or by small decisionmaking elites—often
not very representative of society at large. To really understand the foreign
policy inclinations of a state, there is really no substitute for an analysis of the
factors that influence the individuals in the decisionmaking elite—their shared
cultural perceptions and values, individual personalities, and life experiences.
Related to this broader issue is the importance of examining the actual processes
of foreign policy decisionmaking, including a detailed look at how the relevant
actors relate to each other (based, for example, on ties of kinship, patron-client
relations, formative cohorts or shared ideology). The real questions here are:
who is obliged to whom and for what, and are these kinds of relationships
enduring in Kenyan political culture or are they undergoing significant change?
In-depth analysis of such issues, drawing from other traditions of scholarship,
would have significantly strengthened this work.
A second limitation is an apparent reluctance to assess Kenya’s future.
Whatever roles Kenya may currently play in global and regional affairs, its
future depends on the coherence of its internal political institutions—on the
persistence of the weak ties that bind government and civil society. Given these
often fragile connections in African countries, it is dangerous to assume that
the present is a good indication of what is to come. (For a chillingly illustrative example, one need only compare the relatively prosperous and stable
Zimbabwe of 1995 to the basket case of 2011.) Other than allusions to ethnic
competition, the author does not really help the reader understand the centrifugal and centripetal forces in Kenyan society, nor does he map the most likely
alternative futures for the country over the next decade. If the work is to be
really useful to policy makers, it requires a greater focus on the future—to
balance the coverage of past and present.
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The author treads rather lightly both on the capabilities of the Kenyan
security establishment and on emerging African security architecture. The
reader is informed that the combat record of the Kenyan Armed Forces (KAF) is
limited to the nation’s struggle against the “shiftas”—bandits (or dissidents) in
the north. However, Kenya has participated in peace support operations around
the world, has engaged in numerous multilateral military exercises, maintains
a very sophisticated professional military education system, and sends its officers and other ranks in relatively large numbers to military education courses
abroad—so it should not be too difficult to get a sense of the professionalism
and capabilities of the KAF. Likewise, Kenya is a key actor in a new African
security architecture sponsored by the Africa Union. If that structure coalesces
as envisioned, it will play an important role in Kenya’s strategic future—a
theme that begs for additional attention.
As a final comment, the publisher shortchanged its editing role in this
work. A thorough peer review process would have helped capture some of the
missing detail noted above. The author himself is generally articulate, but the
text, while certainly readable, is sprinkled with typographical errors and occasionally awkward syntax.
Despite its limitations, the book contains much useful information and
very good insight. It seems oriented primarily toward an American audience
that starts with a limited background in African studies. It emphasizes breadth
of coverage rather than depth. With those characteristics in view, it is nonetheless a valuable addition to the literature.

Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism,
and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity
Courtesy of PublicAffairs

by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen
Reviewed by Michael H. Hoffman, Assistant Professor,
US Army Command and General Staff College

T

his book examines a stark challenge, one that’s been the
focal point for the murder of millions but has escaped
New York:
systematic study by those responsible for its prevention.
PublicAffairs, 2009
Daniel Goldhagen offers his paradigm for genocide and its
672 pages
mechanisms in Worse Than War. This combative, clearly
$29.95
written, sometimes repetitive book offers an interdisciplinary perspective on genocide, incorporating more elements
than readers have likely encountered or considered elsewhere.
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide aims to prevent and punish “acts committed with intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . .” This
framework does not fully capture the universe of mass crimes that military and
interagency planners will likely consider genocide. Goldhagen argues that the
acts he identifies as eliminationism provide the most useful frame of reference.

Summer 2011

103

Book Reviews

“Identifying these five eliminationist means of transformation, repression,
expulsion, prevention of reproduction, and extermination suggests something
fundamental that has escaped notice: from the perpetrators’ viewpoint these
elminationist means are (rough) functional equivalents.”
Readers looking for analysis of genocide will find it in this book, but
should proceed with the understanding that Goldhagen examines genocide as
a grim subset of the range of crimes and atrocities he calls eliminationism. The
book explores a wide range of subjects that should be of concern to anyone with
academic, operational, diplomatic, or legal concerns regarding genocide. The
author outlines why genocidal crimes are committed, how, their methods, and
the psychology. He concludes with recommendations for remedial action. The
author’s ambitious reach and passionate conviction carries pluses and minuses.
Commanders, staff, and their interagency colleagues seeking operational design insight for counter-genocide missions will find a great deal in this
book. Given its length and the complexity of ideas presented, they need to start
reading now. Worse Than War does not lend itself to prompt translation into
practical action or instant eureka moments. Though clearly written, the sheer
range of this study requires time to think it through well before any application.
For example, chapter four, “How They Are Implemented,” includes
a section on methods of genocide, and more broadly, the author’s construct
“eliminationism,” institutions involved, and resistance. Operational design
also requires an understanding of the more tangible considerations such as
motivational factors, and these, for instance, are addressed later in chapter five.
On the plus side, this wide range of coverage lends itself to long term intellectual
skill building for counter-genocide understanding and visualization. On the
negative side, the author’s wide interdisciplinary approach leads to specialized
fields beyond his own (political science) where he has no apparent academic
or professional expertise. His justifiable passion for the subject also lends itself
to a number of strongly held beliefs that invite equally passionate opposing
points of view from scholars and practitioners who fully share his dedication
to the fight against genocide. This broad reach sometimes derails Goldhagen’s
main points.
Readers need go no further than page six for the author’s opening argument that President Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki ranks with the crimes of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol Pot. Goldhagen
returns to this theme later in the book with little evidence or analysis to support
his position. Other assertions may appear more nuanced to the casual reader but
serve as red flags for specialists.
This reviewer, who has practiced and written in the field of international
law for decades, was puzzled rather than antagonized by Goldhagen’s confident
and matter of fact assertion that the law of war conventions historically focused
on combatants and interstate warfare rather than civilians, “because the states’
own prerogatives to act as they wished would thereby be compromised.
Political leaders wanted impunity to slaughter or to violently repress their own
people as necessary, and to slaughter, expel, coerce, even enslave other peoples
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abroad.” The modern law of war possesses a fairly extensive historical trail,
and an overwhelming argument can be made countering Goldhagen on this
point. This, however, goes beyond the scope of this review, but the point should
be taken that readers from varied occupations and specialties may find other
interpretations of fact, theory, and history in this book open to challenge.
Goldhagen’s willingness to take provocative and debatable positions
opens potentially crucial lines of inquiry avoided by many other writers. His
section on “New Threats” is particularly worth reading primarily due to his views
on trends in the Islamic world. He writes that “Political Islam is currently the
one expressly, publicly, and unabashedly genocidal major political movement.”
Despite its problems, the book is worth the substantial investment of
time required of readers who want an interdisciplinary perspective on genocide
or those who may find themselves tasked with the responsibility of countering
such horrors. Recent history points toward more of these threats and this book
is a pioneering interdisciplinary effort to analyze and explain them.

Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/
Hiroshima/9-11/Iraq
Courtesy of W. W. Norton

by John W. Dower
Reviewed by Jeffrey Record, Professor of Strategy, Air
War College, and author of A War It Was Always Going to
Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in 1941

J

ohn W. Dower, a Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is America’s leading
historian of modern US-Japanese relations and the prize596 pages
winning author of Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake
of World War II and War Without Mercy: Race and Power
$29.95
in the Pacific War. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
on lower Manhattan and the Pentagon prompted him to begin writing a book
comparing them to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 60 years earlier. Dower
believed both Pearl Harbor and 9/11 exposed a disastrous failure of American
imagination—i.e., a failure to recognize, much less understand, the motivations and capabilities of Imperial Japan and al Qaeda, respectively. American
analysts and decisionmakers were “simply unable to project the daring and
ingenuity of the enemy.” Japan’s decision for war with the United States also
had much in common with the American decision to invade Iraq: “Like Japan’s
attack in 1941, America’s war of choice against Iraq was tactically brilliant but
strategically idiotic . . . . In neither case did [planners] give due diligence to
evaluating risk, anticipating worse-case scenarios, formulating a coherent and
realistic endgame, or planning for protracted conflict.” Indeed, in both pre-Pearl
Harbor Tokyo and post-9/11 Washington, “[i]deology, emotion, and wishful
thinking overrode rationality at the highest level, and criticism was tarred with
an onus of defeatism, moral weakness, even intimations of treason once the
machinery of war was actually set in motion.”
New York: W. W.
Norton, 2010
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Further reflection led Dower to compare 9/11 and the US incendiary and
atomic bombing of Japanese cities in 1945, which in turn, especially as Operation
Iraqi Freedom degenerated into a fiasco, prompted a comparison of the American
occupation of Japan and the George W. Bush administration’s performance
in post-Saddam Iraq. “[M]uch that was associated with September 11 had an
almost generic familiarity that accounts for the immediate analogies to Pearl
Harbor and World War II; surprise attack, a colossal failure of US intelligence,
terror involving the targeting of noncombatants, the specter of weapons of mass
destruction and ‘mushroom clouds,’ rhetoric of holy war on all sides.”
Part I of Cultures of War examines the attacks and intelligence failures
on the US side in 1941 and 2001, including the “institutional, intellectual,
and psychological pathologies” involved. Part II uses the designation of the
devastated World Trade Center site as “Ground Zero” as a departure point
for “reconsidering the emergence of terror bombing as standard operating
procedure” in the British and American strategic bombing campaigns of World
War II. Mass slaughter from the air was hardly a novelty in 2001. (Think of what
Osama bin Laden could have done to New York City with the armada of B-29s
that Curtis LeMay used to burn Tokyo!) Part III assesses the ingredients of
post-1945 American political success in Japan—early and comprehensive US
planning for postwar Japan, the moral legitimacy of the American occupation,
the presence of competent Japanese administrative machinery, and Japan’s
social cohesion and geographic isolation— and why that success could never
have been repeated in Iraq. The historical analogies relevant to Iraq, Dower
correctly points out, were the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1981
to 1989 and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank beginning in 1967. “To
lightly choose to invade and occupy yet another region in the Middle East in the
face of such precedents, and without intense contingency planning, was hubris
bordering on madness.”
Cultures of War is a study of great power arrogance and ignorance,
especially in dealing with enemies whose material inferiority masks an offsetting
determination, imagination, and skill. Despising a small enemy (Japan in 1941,
al Qaeda in 2001) can be dangerous. Dower writes well, argues provocatively
(some might say polemically), and offers intriguing insight. His treatment of the
contentious issues of the US strategic bombing of Japan and the origins of the
US-Soviet nuclear arms race is second to none, as is his devastating critique of
“faith-based thinking,” which blocks critical appraisal of one’s own assumptions
and decisions while simultaneously giving short shrift to the circumstances,
attitudes, and capabilities of others. When Admiral Husband Kimmel, who
commanded the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii in December 1941, was later
asked why he left the fleet in Pearl Harbor even after receiving a warning from
Washington that war with Japan was imminent, he replied: “I never thought
those little yellow sons-of-bitches could pull off such an attack, so far from
Japan.” Nor is Dower afraid to assert parallels between Pearl Harbor and OIF,
or for that matter between George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden: “After 9-11,
[both men] came to personify holy war in the old-fashioned sense of a clash of
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faiths, cultures, and civilizations. They quoted scripture, posited a Manichaean
world of good versus evil, and never ceased to evoke the Almighty and portray
themselves as His righteous and wrathful agent. Both were deeply religious
men who lived in realms of certitude fortified against doubt and criticism.”
If Cultures of War has a downside, it is Dower’s attempt to keep too many
themes and narratives in the air at the same time. Cultures of War can be read as
several smaller books sheltered in a single volume. It is occasionally repetitious
and somewhat disorderly. It is not on par with his magisterial Embracing Defeat
or compelling War Without Mercy. That said, Cultures of War is an outstanding
historian’s convincing employment of Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and the
American occupation of postwar Japan to improve our understanding of 9/11
and why things went so wrong for the United States in Iraq. It is reasoning by
historical analogy at its best.

Courtesy of Naval Institute Press

Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy
Thinks Differently
by Roger W. Barnett
Reviewed by Albert F. Lord Jr., CAPT (USN Retired),
former US Navy Senior Service Representative to the US
Army War College

R

oger Barnett is a master at describing the “peculiar
psychology” of the Navy. Why naval officers look at
the world in a unique way has mystified fellow military offi256 pages
cers and civilians since at least the time of Henry Stimson’s
$28.95
famous quote about the “dim religious world.” The author
peels back the curtain and very effectively shows why the
maritime environment shapes the world view and shows the tactical, operational,
and strategic thought process of those who live and fight at sea.
The strength of this treatise lies in the first two-thirds of the book. He
weaves naval history, an appreciation of the ocean environment, today’s complex
geopolitical situation, and military science throughout. Barnett builds his
argument carefully, and his language will be familiar to recent graduates of US
military war colleges.
The book starts with the recent ascension of Navy officers to the
chairmanship of the joint chiefs of staff and the highest visibility combatant
commands. He asserts the unique background of senior Navy officers and their
appreciation for the day-to-day nature of military influence in the worldwide
security arena allows them to think strategically. Culture specific to the US
Navy is examined in depth and placed within that of the larger military. Not
surprisingly, the demanding ocean domain is the greatest influence that gives
the Navy its singular outlook. The ship is the embodiment of Navy culture and
it builds teamwork, self-reliance, and an independence that culminates in the
governing concept of command-at-sea. The faith and confidence placed in ship
captains, those closest to the action, fosters a disdain for doctrine and limits to
Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2009
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freedom of action. Naval officers are comfortable with overarching concepts
rather than definitions and know, like conditions at sea, the situation at hand is
apt to change suddenly and without warning.
Barnett breaks down the maritime environment into physical, political,
legal, and economic aspects. His examples are well-chosen but he fails to
address the international tension of late concerning resources specifically in
the Arctic or South China Sea. He continues by providing a primer on the
differing strategies for employment of naval forces and rightly focuses on the
expeditionary characteristics of naval forces and their unique contribution to the
capabilities required of a modern joint force. He could have greatly strengthened
his argument by highlighting how those strategies fit into current joint doctrine
and he overstates the logistic self-sufficiency of naval task forces a bit. The role
of technology has been and continues to be important to sailors and Barnett
effectively convinces the reader why this is so. The genesis of network centric
warfare (NCW) is the early work on Naval Tactical Data exchange developed
in the 60s and continually refined since. In his description, however, he comes
perilously close to over promising that NCW will cut through the fog of war to
provide near 100 percent situational awareness to commanders. The maritime
environment will never be fully transparent, above, on the surface, or under
the sea. The above small criticisms do not detract from a valuable contribution
which provides a window into the DNA of US naval officers.
The author also decided to address what he considers dangers to the
Navy culture. In a chapter called “Retrospective” he decries the tendency to see
the terrorist challenge as one of law enforcement and sees this as diluting the
warfighting focus of the Navy. He states, “The Navy Strategic Culture is about
the conduct of war; it is definitively not about law enforcement.” Nothing could
be further from the truth. Throughout its history the Navy has had an international
policing function. Safeguarding commerce against piracy, combatting the slave
trade, enforcing international sanctions, counter drug and counter proliferation
operations, and exercising freedom of navigation are core competencies—an
essential part of the Navy’s ethos. The Navy’s ability to be an effective and
credible interagency partner is essential to its 21st century defense identity. In
addition, he takes on jointness by saying the Navy is inherently joint because
of Naval aviation and the Marine Corps and can be described as “indifferent” to
working in the joint arena. This contradicts his earlier supposition concerning
the selection of Navy officers to the chairmanship and to lead the combatant
commands. He also discounts the missions of mine and riverine warfare, seeing
them as sideshows and not worth the investment they clearly deserve.
The greatest error is where Barnett addresses civil-military relations.
Seemingly a proponent of the Powell Doctrine’s use of overwhelming force, he
sees limitations put on the use of the military instrument of power or restrictive
rules of engagement as too constraining. He also criticizes the apparent
feminization of the Navy—the mixed-gender crews of ships—as having a
deleterious effect on warfighting capability. His footnotes refer to sources
that assert that any differences, physiological or psychological, between men
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and women automatically disqualify women for combat roles. The USS Cole
had a mixed-gender compliment in October of 2000 and the heroism on the
part of the entire crew saved that ship. This reviewer served with women in
combat during Operation Enduring Freedom and the fighting efficiency was not
impaired, even during the longest at-sea deployment (158 days without a port
visit) since World War II. Mixed-gender crews have served on combatant ships
since the early 1990s; lessons were learned early on and, simply stated, good
leadership and an effective command climate is essential to training a combat
capable team and conducting operations. The ship has sailed on this issue.
There is much to recommend in Navy Strategic Culture. The author
has written eloquently on the unique role of the Navy and its contribution to
national defense strategy. In particular, the Navy’s sister service officers will
gain an education in the capabilities and thought processes required to put
together a joint team. Barnett dilutes his powerful message, however, when he
editorializes and tries to speak for current Navy strategists.

Courtesy of Univ. Press of Kansas

Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter
War of 1915
by Graydon A. Tunstall
Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Deputy Dean,
US Army War College

T

he Eastern Front of the Great War has arguably
been the poor cousin of the Western Front as the
Lawrence, KS: Univ.
First
World War has been compared with the Second, in
Press of Kansas,
2010
terms of renown. Tunstall has gone much further afield
in his emphasis on just the Austro-Hungarian Carpathian
258 pages
Winter Campaign of 1915. His work is quite concise, a
$29.95
mere 212 pages of text in only six chapters. The first is
the “Introduction,” takes about 15 percent of the space, and sets the stage for
several key points. He returns to these key points throughout the text. Indeed,
he reinforces them immediately and at length in the first chapter entitled
“Background to the Battles,” which describes the preliminary operations and
preparations for the “First Offensive.”
Tunstall soon establishes his focus on the Austro-Hungarian forces.
He devotes considerable effort articulating the seemingly-insurmountable
challenges that confronted the army of Franz Joseph. First, the author reiterates
several times that the devastating losses by December 1914 had reduced the
Hapsburg army to a militia. The casualties had been crippling, not merely
in terms of simple numbers, but in particular among the professional officer
corps, trained and educated to deal with a multi-ethnic military. Troops were
increasingly older, less hardy, and lacked adequate training. In essence, the
Austro-Hungarian Army suffered some 50 percent casualties overall in the
opening operations during 1914.
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Second, the Carpathian Front lacked the requisite infrastructure,
especially transportation, to sustain large forces. Indeed, pre-war planning
deemed the Carpathians a pass-through vice maneuver zone. Two tables and
detailed discussion highlight the herculean-like efforts required to concentrate,
reinforce, and sustain forces in this theater. The Austro-Hungarian railroad
system lacked both capability and capacity for major, offensive operations
here. The wintry weather degraded already-limited roads.
Third, the failure of the plan to achieve rapid success necessitated the
unprecedented, prolonged conduct of operations in mountains during winter.
The extreme temperatures at high elevation accounted for many more casualties
than combat among troops lacking uniforms and equipment for winter warfare.
These conditions also rendered every type of action more difficult, the more so
as a Hapsburg planning assumption was surprise. Why, then, attack?
Three factors beckoned Hötzendorf to the Carpathian Front. The first
was Russian success. Czarist troops were postured to complete their transit
of the Carpathians and spill south onto the Hungarian plain, a potentially
devastating blow to morale. The second was what appeared to be the moral,
political, and military imperative to push the Russians back north, relieve the
fortress of Przemyśl, and reclaim the province of Galicia. Finally, a major
Hapsburg success was necessary to discourage Italian and Rumanian entrance
into the war with the Triple Entente.
Hötzendorf’s cherished offensive, launched with 20½ divisions from
Second and South Armies on 23 January 1915, failed. Poor visibility, ice,
and heavy snow stymied combined-arms operations. The Russians defended
stoutly. An aggressive General Nikolai Yudevich Ivanov was unrelenting in
his counterattacks; he sought the dreaded invasion of the Hungarian plain.
A second attempt began on 27 February. Heavy snow alternated with thaws
and commensurate temperature fluctuations. Nonetheless, this attack was the
only occasion when the Austrians had numerical superiority over the Russians,
forty-one divisions from Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, Third, Second, and
South Armies. They failed for similar reasons which defeated the first attack.
Tunstall’s table of the paltry artillery support available to Second Army units
in this regard is telling, though it accomplished some success. Indeed, Tunstall
states that front-line units reached within fifty kilometers of Przemyśl. A third
attack, launched on 20 March—a day later than a breakout attempt from
Przemyśl—also failed, for the same general reasons. The fortress surrendered
on 22 March, freeing besieging Russian troops to reinforce their Carpathian
units. Worse, remorseless Russian counterattacks developed into a concerted
offensive to sever Second and Third Armies and spill onto the Hungarian plain.
Second Army in particular was hard pressed to prevent a Russian breakthrough.
Ultimately, a combined Austro-German counterattack in early April known as
Easter Battle salvaged the situation, but Russian attacks occurred until 20 April.
No surprise, Tunstall has written a blistering assessment of the Austrian
High Command in general and Hötzendorf in particular. His critiques go back
to Austrian pre-war planning through the disasters of 1914. Then Austrian
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leaders stubbornly and/or blindly assumed that the 1915 operations would be
brief. He concludes that the greatest Austrian efforts still constituted inadequate
preparation, resulting in failure to mass and insufficient reserves. Instead,
sustained winter, and mountain operations involved no less than two-thirds
of the Austro-Hungarian Army, cost another 800,000 casualties, and seriously
damaged its resiliency. The defeat led directly to determined German intervention
and decisive victory at Gorlice-Tarnow, but at the price of diminished freedom
of action in light of powerful German assistance.
The book has a fairly-easy style, but there are challenges. The author
discusses numerous units from field army to division; at times the reader is hard
pressed to follow. An order of battle could have mitigated some confusion. The
text incorporates nine maps; six are in the preliminary Introduction and Chapter
1. Similar level of map support of the Second and Third Offensives would have
been helpful. Finally, Tunstall writes with many superlatives, rightly hammering
home the sheer scope of the Carpathian Campaign. The reader must digest these
statistics carefully and often; otherwise, they sometimes appear contradictory.
The book is a detailed case study, based on extensive primary-source
research, of an attempt to devise a viable strategy to meet drastically-changed,
unforeseen conditions with impending crisis—and with an increasingly
domineering ally. In that sense it is of interest to senior leaders today. The
detailed description of the campaign with its three principal actions may be
excessive for the nonmilitary historian.

Courtesy of Naval Institute Press,

Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle
of 73 Easting
by Douglas Macgregor
Reviewed by Jim Shufelt, COL (USA Retired), Center
for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

E

ither loved or hated by his military readers, Douglas
Macgregor has never pulled his punches when
Annapolis: Naval
expressing his ideas about history, military strategy,
Institute Press, 2009
Army Transformation, or related issues. Warrior’s Rage,
244 pages
his autobiographical account of the Battle of 73 Easting
$29.95
during the First Iraq War, accompanied by his analysis
of the long-term strategic impact of the battle, is another
Macgregor book that will be either wholeheartedly accepted or rejected by its
readers because of its explicit descriptions, sharp analysis, and blunt conclusions. Some Army senior leaders from that conflict may find it uncomfortable,
as the author has no problem naming names in his analysis of tactical, operational, and strategic decisions before, during, and after the battle. Regardless, it
is an enthralling story of combat and its conclusions will challenge many past
and serving strategic leaders.
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Told primarily from the turret of Macgregor’s M1A1 ABRAMs tank,
Warrior’s Rage vividly describes the experiences of Cougar Squadron, the 2nd
Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/2 ACR), during Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which culminated in a classic armor battle. A
battle that unquestionably demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of US
tactical unit leadership, tactics, training, and equipment when faced with the most
elite units of the Iraqi Army—the Republican Guard. Macgregor, the Cougar
Squadron Operations Officer, captures the chaos of tactical combat, the lethality of modern weapons systems, and the complexity of joint fires. His love for
American soldiers is clear, as is his personal disdain for the operational and strategic leaders he believes failed to fully exploit the tactical victory of 73 Easting.
Macgregor characterizes this fight as an overwhelming tactical success,
which created an operational opportunity for a bold strike that could have
destroyed the fleeing elements of the Republican Guard. When this opportunity
was not grasped, the stage was set for continued conflict in Iraq—a conflict
that is still unresolved almost twenty years later. Macgregor cites many explanations for this failure. Numerous strategic intelligence mistakes, including
continued overestimation of enemy force numbers and capabilities, fed the
fears of already conservative operational and strategic leaders. Over-stretched
lines of communications and unpracticed extended-distance logistics procedures raised further concerns in risk-averse tactical commanders. An Army
unpracticed in large-scale maneuver defaulted to a mechanical delineation of
the battlefield that discouraged bold maneuver and denied the fluidity of the
situation. Coordination among joint forces, coalition partners, and adjacent and
passing units was haphazard at best. Commanders at every level were tied to
command posts rather than the front lines of battle, and thus failed to quickly
identify and leverage tactical and operational opportunities.
There are positive elements in Warrior’s Rage, along with numerous
indictments. Macgregor’s account identifies skilled and capable junior officers,
noncommissioned officers, and enlisted troops who have continued to contribute significantly to the Army and the nation, to include two who are now serving
general officers. 2/2 ACR was clearly a strong unit that made the most of its
opportunities prior to the battle to train for the challenges of an extended desert
war, building on a base of proven doctrine, quality small unit and gunnery training in Europe, and motivated and talented tactical unit leaders. The inherent
flexibility and massive combat power of an armored cavalry squadron is vividly
demonstrated throughout Cougar Squadron’s attack into Iraq.
More than a few potential readers may decide to not even open this
book because of its author. Others may choose to close it half-read, uncomfortable with the blunt criticism of well-respected general officers such as
Frederick Franks and Norman Schwarzkopf. Regardless, the overall impact of
Macgregor’s book is limited, because his intent is not clear—is it an autobiography, a unit history, or a critical analysis of operational and strategic leadership
during the conflict? As an autobiography, it is interesting, but of limited scope.
As a history, it provides a good story of a single unit in a critical fight, and there
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is value in this account. As critical analysis, it is incomplete and hampered by
the author’s repetitive broad-brushed attacks on senior leaders. Macgregor’s
obvious disdain for his immediate superiors quickly grows tiresome. The many
issues he raises with operational and strategic leaders before, during, and after
Desert Storm are well-documented elsewhere. Blaming these leaders and their
successors for many issues in the current fight is new, but Macgregor fails to
provide any detailed recommendations about what can be done in response.
This lack of detailed recommendations is unfortunate, given Macgregor’s previous writings on Army Transformation, where he provided numerous useful
suggestions. Despite these issues, Warrior’s Rage is worth reading, if only for
the well-told story of 2/2 ACR’s Desert Storm experience.

Courtesy of Potomac Books Inc.

The George W. Bush Defense Program: Policy,
Strategy & War
edited by Stephen J. Cimbala
Reviewed by Dr. John C. Binkley, Professor
of History and Government, University of Maryland,
University College

M

ost examinations of the defense policies during
the two terms of President George W. Bush tend
to begin and end with Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global
317 pages
War on Terrorism. These issues so overwhelmed all other
$60.00
aspects of the Bush defense program that one tends to
forget there was a defense program prior to 9/11 and there
were defense issues that continued to be addressed after 9/11 that were not
directly related to the war on terrorism. To appreciate the long term impact of
the Bush era, it is necessary to understand and consider the interrelationship of
those major issues, i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, and terrorism, with the other policies developed during this administration’s eight years and place them within
a theoretical and historical context. This was Professor Stephen Cimbala’s
intent as he brought together an impressive collection of experts to opine on
various aspects of the administration’s efforts in The George W. Bush Defense
Program: Policy, Strategy & War.
A collection of essays, no matter the topic, presents certain difficulties
for any reviewer. The first difficulty is usually the uneven quality of the essays.
This reviewer is happy to write that Professor Cimbala and his ten other authors
have produced a scholarly yet quite readable set of essays that generally fall into
the following topics: military transformation, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars,
civil-military relations and how it affected the Bush defense program, nuclear
weapons and arms control with a special focus on US-Russian relations, and
the impact of the Bush defense program on American international relations. A
second difficulty is the diversity of the essays. Too often editors do not identify
the unifying themes that make a series of disparate essays a cohesive whole.
Unfortunately, neither the introduction nor the conclusion pointed the reader to
Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books Inc., 2010
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the underlying themes that unified the essays and it is left to the reader to patch
together the linkages. Consequently, this reviewer will note a few of the themes
and relate them to some of the individual essays.
The first theme is the administration’s failure to consider the possibility
of unintended consequences, unexpected results, and generally to think through
the ramifications of its decisions. These issues are raised in a wonderful essay
by Colin Gray entitled “Coping with Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defense
Planning.” Appropriately, this is the first essay presented in the book. Gray,
one of the deans of western strategic theory, offers in a checklist-type format
a series of pithy foundational thoughts that a defense planner needs to include
in his or her cognitive processes—all with the understanding that much of
what the defense planner does is guesswork, albeit based on certain historical,
sociological, technological, or bureaucratic facts, but guesswork nevertheless.
While Gray’s ideas are generic in nature and do not specifically address the
Bush policies, after reading the other essays, it is obvious that the ideas formed
the foundation, whether intended or not, for the other writers’ evaluations of
the administration’s policies. This essay should be required reading for those
officers moving into or already involved in long-rang planning assignments.
A second theme is how the Bush administration detrimentally affected
its own programs by embracing unilateralism. The meaning here is the belief
that the United States did not necessarily need the support of other nations
nor did it consider the historical and political concerns of other states as we
developed our programs. This theme is very evident in Peter Forester’s article
on “Sharing the Burden of Coalition War Fighting: NATO and Afghanistan”
and Stephen Blank’s “Cold Obstruction: The Legacy of US-Russian Relations
Under George W. Bush.” Blank clearly shows how the Bush administration never
understood that its abandonment of the ABM Treaty, along with its efforts to
place theater ABM systems in Eastern Europe, undermined its own rhetoric that
Russia was no longer a Cold War enemy but a partner in the new war on terror.
Over sixty years ago, George F. Kennan described how traditional Russian
paranoia helped set the stage for the Cold War. The Bush administration’s
actions simply fed into that paranoia. Similarly, Forester’s article explores the
difficulties in fighting a coalition war, and particularly a NATO coalition that
is Eurocentric, in the absence of “a clearly unified policy at both the strategic
and operational level.” The problem of unilateralism permeates a number of
other essays as well. Larry Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American
Progress, in his essay “An Exit Strategy from Iraq,” points out the reality that
any US exit strategy must involve other countries sharing some of the burden
of political and social reconstruction. The Bush administration’s unilateralism
was a continuing obstacle to such international burden sharing.
A parallel theme to unilateralism is policy hubris. By this I mean the
firm belief on the part of the Bush administration that they knew all the answers
and ignored any dissent. Among the articles that address this theme are Dale
Herspring’s portrait of Donald Rumsfeld’s management style, John Allen
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Williams’ analysis of civil-military relations, and William Martel’s critique of
the administration’s efforts to define its policy in Iraq.
Military transformation, sometime referred to as revolution in military
affairs, is another theme repeatedly addressed. Paul Davis’s essay on military
transformation is an excellent overview of the modern history of transformation
theory, how that theory was applied by the Bush administration, and where does
transformation seem to be going. It is worth reading as a stand-alone article for
any officer interested in the evolution and direction of transformation. But the
administration’s view of transformation was directly related to its policy hubris.
Secretary Rumsfeld and a number of other Bush appointees were so convinced
in their vision of transformation that they ignored any advice to the contrary.
This was most apparent in the post-military operational phase in Iraq, but it also
had a detrimental impact on the administration’s arms control efforts.
While there are other general themes one could identify, the limits of space
prevent further discussion. As in the case of all collections of essays, different
readers will find some articles of greater value than others, but taken as a whole,
most readers interested in the defense policies of the Bush administration will
find some if not many of these articles of great value. Obviously, as documents
become more available, a more complete examination of the totality of the
Bush defense program will be written, but in the interim, Professor Cimbala
and his cadre of authors have certainly offered us an excellent first edition.

Osama Bin Laden: A Biography
by Thomas R. Mockaitis

Courtesy of Greenwood

Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

T

he personality and mental processes of Osama bin
Laden were never easy for Westerners to understand.
Too often he was dismissed as a villain who acts out of
blind fanaticism without the capacity to develop a wellSanta Barbara, CA:
defined strategy or clear operational plan for reaching
Greenwood, 2010
his goals. This sort of approach was a mistake. While bin
152 pages
Laden’s ruthlessness was undeniable, he was nevertheless
$35.00
a thinking, planning enemy who needed to be treated as
such. Bin Laden and al Qaeda have often shown that they have clear strategies
and coherent goals based on their own (admittedly warped) values systems.
The development of effective counterstrategies for dealing with al Qaeda and
then destroying it therefore depend upon understanding the background and
mindset of this man in reasonably sophisticated terms. Moreover, since at least
some aspects of how to deal with bin Laden are matters of public, media, and
congressional discussion, a more sophisticated understanding of this individual
among nonexperts may be of considerable value.
Thomas Mockaitis in his short and straightforward book, Osama Bin
Laden: A Biography, clearly understands the difficulty of making bin Laden
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comprehensible as more than a one dimensional figure. His book is specifically
written for the nonspecialist reader and can easily be read in one evening. It
therefore may serve as a useful starting point for thinking about bin Laden
in a sophisticated way as well as a helpful analysis for clearing up important
misperceptions about bin Laden’s life. The author approaches this task by
stressing the political rather than personal aspects of bin Laden’s life, although
the work does contain personal details that may help to illuminate his path to
becoming the world’s most well-known terrorist. The book is well-organized,
packed with facts, and contains a number of useful documents as appendixes
as well as an annotated bibliography which may help guide nonspecialist
readers seeking additional sources to continue learning about bin Laden and
his movement. Consequently, this study clearly meets the accessibility goal that
Mockaitis has set for himself.
In approaching his subject, Mockaitis acknowledges problems in
establishing the key events and influences of bin Laden’s early life due to a
lack of sources. He does note bin Laden’s relatively limited education in Saudi
Arabia and his lack of exposure to overseas study unlike many of his brothers.
Mockaitis also pays suitable attention to the intellectual currents influencing bin
Laden throughout his life such as the psychological aftermath of the massive
Arab defeat by Israel in 1967. A constant thread in this book is that bin Laden
was able to gain attention and respect (far beyond what his intellect should
have commanded) because of his personal wealth and his ability to attract
more gifted followers seeking the benefit of his largesse. The most prominent
examples of this trend are his early mentor, the now-deceased Palestinian
radical Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian
organization, Islamic Jihad, which merged with al Qaeda in 2001, allowing
Zawahiri to become the organization’s deputy leader. Bin Laden, in turn, was
able to make good use of the services and ideas of both men.
The author also usefully attempts to correct some fairly widespread
misperceptions and disinformation about bin Laden’s background such as the
myth that the foreign fighters he funded were decisive to the outcome of the
anti-Soviet Afghan war. While Mockaitis is not the first person to note this
falsehood, bin Laden and his supporters have been so successful in embellishing
their role in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan that any effort to correct the
record is a public service as well as a useful statement on al Qaeda’s strong
capabilities for the dissemination of propaganda. Foreign mujahideen were too
few and usually too incompetent to play much of a role in Afghanistan. Often
the only reason that these people were tolerated by the Afghan fighters was
the funding and other resources that they provided to those who were much
more involved in the fighting. He notes that foreign fighters in that war never
numbered more than a few thousand at any one time and often included wealthy
Arabs on school vacations, essentially playing at being guerrillas. The role of
radical Arab fighters in resisting American troops in Somalia was similarly
exaggerated as Mockaitis correctly points out.
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Despite this book’s strengths, as an overview, it has occasional problems
with nuance such as when the author speaks of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a
defeat that conservative Muslims attributed to divine disfavor. Actually, many
Arabs and especially the Egyptians view the 1973 War as a victory. October 6 is
still a national holiday in Egypt, and the crossing of the Suez Canal is viewed as
a monumental achievement. The second half of the war, when Israel turned the
tables, is often distorted and minimized. The real soul searching that led more
people to favor a radical Islamist approach to Arab problems actually came
following the June 1967 War when two secular socialist regimes (Egypt and
Syria) as well as the Jordanian monarchy were undeniably trounced in a military
confrontation with Israel. In addition to issues of nuance, there are also some
small problems with the book that suggest it might have been more carefully
reviewed before it when to press. Sayid Qutb was executed in August 1966 and
not 1967 as the author maintains. In describing the nature of historical theories,
the author mentions William Wallace as a collaborator with Darwin when it
was actually Alfred Russell Wallace. Bruce Riedel and Lawrence Wright are
mentioned in some parts of the book by their correct names and also referred to
with various incorrect first names. These problems are nevertheless minor and
should not be allowed to become too large a distraction from the overall quality
of the book which remains a valuable work serving a useful purpose.

Courtesy of Univ. Press of Kentucky

Beetle: The Life of General Walter Bedell
Smith
by D. K. R. Crosswell
Reviewed by Dr. Conrad Crane, Director of the US
Army Military History Institute

W

hile assisting Merle Miller with research for a biography about Dwight Eisenhower in the early 1980s,
Lexington, KY: Univ.
D.K.R. Crosswell discovered General Walter Bedell
Press of Kentucky,
2010
“Beetle” Smith, Ike’s wartime Chief of Staff. In 1991,
1,070 pages
Crosswell published The Chief of Staff: The Military
Career of General Walter Bedell Smith with Greenwood
$39.95
Press. For two decades that volume has remained the best
work on Smith. When Roger Cirillo, director of the Association of the United
States Army book program, approached Crosswell about republishing it, the
author suggested writing a new biography instead.
The resulting revision is more than twice as long as the original. As is
clear from the titles, the current volume provides a more expansive discussion
of Smith’s career after World War II, when he served as ambassador to the
Soviet Union, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Undersecretary of
State, and representative of the United States at the Geneva Talks on Indochina.
Crosswell turned the 12-page epilogue of his first work into a 106-page prologue,
a strange sequencing that opens the new book in 1945. The most interesting
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revelations are in the section about Geneva, where Smith’s deft maneuvering,
which included some unique personal diplomacy with the Chinese, was essential in obtaining a qualified American success from the agreement on Indochina
that Crosswell calls “the last hurrah of the Ike-Beetle team.”
The rest of the book parallels the earlier volume in its focus on the
establishment and workings of that leadership team that had such an important
impact on the course of World War II. The general narrative of the material
will be familiar to those who have read the earlier biography, but most of the
coverage has been significantly enriched with more detail and added research.
Crosswell has mined archives in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Besides
revealing as much about Eisenhower as Smith, the book is also very good
showing how the “tyranny of logistics” shaped their decisions in a command
system involving contentious allies and prickly personalities. Smith’s career
was additionally influenced by a relationship with George Marshall, whom he
idolized. While Smith felt in later life that he had been exploited as “Ike’s prat
boy,” in death his wife made sure that he was buried in a ceremony just like
Marshall’s, and in an Arlington grave site in close proximity to Marshall’s.
Sometimes it is possible to have too much of a good thing. For a general
reader seeking to learn about “Beetle” Smith and his underappreciated and
often overlooked role in history, the shorter original biography is the best
beginning source. For those serious researchers and scholars looking for more
detailed behind-the-scenes information about the personalities and decisionmaking that produced “Victory in Europe,” they will profit greatly from this
thoroughly-researched, well-written, and reasonably priced new opus.

Courtesy of Cornell Univ. Press

The Power Problem: How American Military
Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less
Prosperous, and Less Free
by Christopher Preble
Reviewed by MAJ William C. Taylor,
Instructor of American Politics, Public Policy and
Strategic Studies, US Military Academy

M

oments of national distress give us pause to reconsider our founding principles as a nation as well as
232 pages
to reconsider the viability of our current grand strategy.
$25.00
As Christopher Preble rightly illustrates in The Power
Problem, much has changed in the 200 years since our
country’s founding. The nation’s political culture has evolved from one which
distrusted standing armies, feared a strong executive, and avoided foreign
entanglements to one which demands an active defense, chastens weak executives, and pursues numerous alliances. Today, amidst 10 years of war, the United
States should reconsider the merits of military activity abroad. Are US foreign
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2009
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policies commensurate with its national resources? When is the use of US force
counterproductive and indeed deleterious to its national security?
With panache, Preble offers a timely monograph in which he chastises
the use of the military as a panacea for US foreign policy. American policy
makers have confused power—the capacity to affect change and the ability
to influence others—with force—a tool that a state employs as an extension
of its power. Power undergirds force, but an overreliance on force can erode
the power foundation. Paradoxically, the expanding use of military force
in the world has actually served to erode US power both domestically and
internationally. As such, Preble contends that policy makers should rely more
on America’s vibrant culture and economic prowess and reserve the use of
military force for clear issues of national defense. Specifically, the US should
deploy military force only when: (1) there are vital American security interests
at stake; (2) there is a clear and attainable military mission; (3) there is broad
public support; and, (4) there is an exit strategy based on a clear understanding
of what constitutes victory.
Preble provocatively questions the rationality of US grand strategy. If
states pursue policies which further their economic wealth and national security
(as many scholars of international relations assert), then on a mere cost-benefit
analysis, the United States is acting quite irrationally. Preble meticulously
provides a ledger of the visible costs of maintaining a military (procurement,
personnel expenses, waging war, deaths, and medical care) as well as the
hidden opportunity costs (military costs preclude rebuilding our infrastructure,
military interventions inadvertently threaten others, and the use of our military
in one location inhibits its use elsewhere). Indeed, Preble’s stark listing of the
military’s price tag (currently $2,065 per US citizen per year) as well as the
opportunity costs (the cost of building one B-2 bomber equals constructing 171
elementary schools) accentuates his point—the costs of our current defense are
too high, and these costs eclipse the supposed benefits.
One might forgive the costs the US invests in its military if it returned a
profitable dividend of national security. Yet Preble argues that our investments
have languished due to false assumptions, allies who ride free, and the
unintended consequences of military intervention. Unlike previous authors,
Preble argues that the United States is not the major beneficiary of the global
economy. Other states, especially US allies that ride free off American security
guarantees, are the primary benefactors of US military expenditures. Preble
also discounts the false notion that the world will slip into chaos if America
no longer fulfills its role as the global policeman. States will peacefully fill
the power vacuum left by the US military to protect their economic interests.
Finally, military interventionism engenders negative externalities, or “public
bads,” which prove counterproductive to US security. A doctrine of preventive
war decreased US security vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, and the presence
of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia elicited the ire of Muslim extremists. In
short, the idea that a heavy US military presence in the world equals increased
security for America is naïve, profoundly flawed, and will serve as a catalyst of
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hegemonic decline. The United States should slowly withdraw its international
commitments and allow other states to fulfill their fair share of the international
provision of public goods. This will not lead to internecine state conflict; rather,
it will further US power abroad.
While Preble rightly questions the merits of utilizing US military force
abroad, readers must also carefully plumb Preble’s myriad assumptions. Will
other states peacefully and cooperatively rebuild their militaries to fill the
US power vacuum? Will US allies forgo nuclear proliferation as Belarus and
Ukraine did or accelerate their development like Iran and North Korea? Will
states continue to promote economic openness due to complex interdependence,
or will states succumb to regional security dilemmas? Does the world truly
admire US culture and economic practices as much as Preble suggests? Preble’s
critique of American military adventurism is sound, but US policy makers
should carefully consider the unintended consequences of reduced American
military activity abroad.
The author’s The Power Problem is an important work which all
foreign policy practitioners should carefully examine. As we are witnessing
in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, the use of military force has its
limitations. A tragedy of hegemonic foreign policy is that in the pursuit of
national security, hegemons often pursue a grand strategy which catalyzes their
decline. As previous scholars have clearly demonstrated, military interventions
do not always increase state security. The use of force, while reliant on power,
may often erode a state’s power in the long run. The strength of any state resides
in a robust, resilient, and regenerative economy. Foreign policy decisionmakers
should be mindful of bureaucratic groupthink and wary of military solutions as
a panacea for international problems. As Preble rightly argues, in many cases
the construction of 171 elementary schools instead of one B-2 bomber would
go much further in advancing our national security.

Courtesy of Princeton Univ. Press

The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and
Consequences for International Politics
by Michael C. Horowitz
Reviewed by Stephen J. Blank, Research Professor of
National Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College

I

t is a truism of military studies that technological innovations do not stay confined to the state which first
makes or presents them. But it also is equally true that
states do not follow each other in mechanical lockstep.
273 pages
Some innovations are improved upon, others are ignored,
$26.95
and often attempts to emulate an innovation fail to realize
the original intent. Horowitz’s book represents an effort to
impart a theoretical basis to the question of how and why nations emulate leaders
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ.
Press, 2010
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in military innovation. Accordingly, the author advances a theory that he calls
adoption-capacity theory to explain the dynamics of emulation and innovation.
According to his theory, to the extent that the financial costs of emulating
a competitor’s innovations are too high, other alternatives, e.g., alliances,
will be found. By the same token, if the emulation in question requires major
organizational transformations in recruiting, training, and war-fighting doctrine,
those innovations will not be made and fewer actors will emulate it. For instance,
a contemporary example involves the revolution in military affairs (RMA).
Soviet experts understood the new technologies that were coming on stream in
the 1970s and grasped their potential for revolutionizing military operations.
Yet the financial, doctrinal, and organizational transformations required of the
USSR to emulate Western technological innovations was so far beyond Soviet
capabilities that the effort was either not made or, when attempted, crashed,
helping to bring down the whole system.
Horowitz tests the theory for four relatively recent innovations in
warfare: nuclear weapons, battle fleet warfare, carrier warfare, and suicide
bombing. And in each case the theory holds up. To be fair, there may be
somewhat less innovation in his thinking than he presents for we have always
intuitively, if not systematically, known that if states lack the resources to
emulate their competitors’ innovations they either fall by the wayside or have
to find surrogates for that kind of innovation. As Dominic Lieven has recently
and brilliantly demonstrated, Imperial Russia could not emulate the Napoleonic
levée en masse and Bonaparte’s tactics nor could it hope to win at the beginning
of the 1812 campaign by fighting Napoleon’s preferred major pitched battle.
Instead, it had to introduce its own reforms and fight a different kind of war that
magnified its advantages and reduced Bonaparte’s.
Nonetheless, the theory is analytically important for it serves to underline
just what it takes for states to compete in world politics and in warfare and points
us in the direction of seeing which states can adapt and survive in an environment
of ceaseless innovations, both minor and major. Russia, for example has yet to
adapt to the RMA and the task may be beyond it. Yet China seems to be making
a relatively smooth adjustment by utilizing its resources to build a formidable
irregular warfare, missile, and naval capability in service of an anti-access
strategy aimed against the United States. Moscow instead is required to find
substitutes, which it has done up until now by emphasizing its nuclear capabilities
and asymmetric responses. This requirement to find substitutes demonstrates
its lack of both financial and organizational resources, and its inadaptability or
inflexibility in military affairs.
If we might rephrase a celebrated quote of Karl Marx here, states do
innovate but they are not free to innovate as they wish. Instead, they operate
under constraints at all times. But some constraints are more permissive or
productive than others. Indeed, the fundamental test of any state’s ability to
remain in the military running is, as Horowitz suggests, closely tied to its
economic-financial and organizational-doctrinal capabilities. The current
crisis’s impact on Europe is graphic evidence of the extent to which successful

Summer 2011

121

Book Reviews

military competition depends upon the possession of those capabilities and how
the lack of them forces a search for innovative alternatives, e.g., Anglo-French
discussions about combining forces. So to the extent that states possess the
requisite capabilities to emulate innovators, they and the innovators can remain
major powers. But the converse is equally true as the Anglo-French example
cited above suggests. Thus, this theory is also a useful means of analyzing the
rise and fall of major powers in the international system. That aspect of the
theory’s utility adds to the value of this valuable and useful analysis.

Drugs and Contemporary Warfare
Courtesy of Potomac Books Inc.

by Paul Rexton Kan
Reviewed by James J. Carafano, Deputy Director
of The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, and Director of the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies

H

ere is an important book on an important subject.
Drugs and Contemporary Warfare examines how
Dulles, VA: Potomac
drug use and trafficking complicate the conduct of
Books Inc., 2009
modern conflict. With US forces battling poppy growers
192 pages
in Afghanistan; with the Mexican military trying to take
$39.95
back territory from peso-rich and better-armed cartels; and
with many parts of the world seeing both trafficking in drugs and the dangers
of failed states on the rise—there are few books that would be more helpful in
a contemporary soldier’s intellectual rucksack.
Paul Kan, an Associate Professor of National Security Studies at the
US Army War College, has written a well-organized and comprehensive guide
to understanding a complex phenomenon that cuts across social, political,
economic, cultural, public health and safety, as well as military fields of
competition. The problem is inherently “inter-disciplinary.” In response, that
is just the approach Kan takes in his analysis and not surprisingly he finds that
a multi-faceted response is most effective in dealing with the challenge. Kan
writes, “a multilayered effort from international organizations, major powers,
and non-state actors is required to fully address the effects of the drug trade on
warfare in today’s world.” It is refreshing to see an analysis of an international
security challenge which eschews the “easy button.” Rather than argue for
some simple-minded, silver-bullet solution, Drugs and Contemporary Warfare
admits that this is just a damn difficult problem
The real utility of Drugs and Contemporary Warfare is its fact-filled
pages packed with useful insight. There is, for example, a long and useful
explanation of the stages of production and distribution for different kinds
of drugs, marking the unique qualities of manufacturing and marketing from
products like heroin, cocaine, and marijuana to synthetic drugs like amphetaminetype stimulants. The author presents a grim account of how warring groups
use drugs for recruiting and retention of child soldiers. Kan details a sobering
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explanation of how high-drug use in combat zones exacerbates undermining
public health and safety making the challenge of ending conflicts successfully
even more problematic.
In the end, however, the greatest challenge Drugs and Contemporary
Warfare finds is that drug-money used to further fuel the trade and increase profits
is inevitably used to challenge law enforcement, public safety, judicial systems,
and even military institutions. “Police are bribed to provide information about
upcoming drug raids,” Kan writes, “while soldiers are paid not to show up for
duty. Prosecutors are bribed not to prosecute and judges not to convict.” When
the death-spiral is allowed to continue, eventually political stability shatters.
There are, of course, always ways to make a good book better. Kan
dabbles with the history of drugs and wars before the contemporary era, but it
is a thin history at best. Drugs and war have been sharing foxholes through the
annals of warfare. That is probably a story worth telling. Modern phenomena
often seem unique, perplexing, and overwhelming simply because we don’t
know our own past. The use of drugs in battle, for example, is anything but new.
During World War II, amphetamine was extensively used to combat fatigue.
Soldiers and pilots popped them like candy. We still do not fully understand
how they impacted the course of the conflict.
Likewise, today neuropharmacology, how drugs affect cellular
function in the nervous system, is often discussed as the next “killer-app,” in
future warfare with designer drugs that do everything from speeding training
to building super-soldier bodies. Drugs and Contemporary Warfare could well
have gone on to address these future challenges.
Still, as is, it is a fine book. Drugs and Contemporary Warfare serves as
a useful introduction to the reality of narcotics on the frontline. It deserves the
attention of military professionals.

Courtesy of Univ. of Tennessee Press

A Nation Forged In War: How World War II
Taught Americans to Get Along
by Thomas Bruscino
Reviewed by Dr. Richard Meinhart, Professor of
Defense and Joint Processes, US Army War College

T

his book’s title captured my interest, as I recently had
a discussion with my father, who is 90 and a veteran
Knoxville, TN: Univ.
of the Battle of the Bulge, about his WWII military experiof Tennessee Press,
ences. Thomas Bruscino, a history professor at the Army
2010
School of Advanced Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
360 pages
wrote this book, which is the first in a Legacies of War
$39.95
series. Bruscino’s main premise, which is aptly supported
by relevant statistical data, historical events, and, perhaps even more powerfully, veterans’ anecdotes, is that the United States was remarkably changed to
be more religious and ethnically tolerant because of veterans’ experiences in
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World War II. Words used by the author to describe this premise are: “the intolerance and bigotry of the United States in the 1920s was visceral, emotional” to
“in the years after WWII almost everyone recognized that ethnic and religious
intolerance decreased dramatically.’’ While the author credits military WWII
service overall for this significant change, he focused on the Army and provided
insight into the “whys” behind the growing tolerance.
The book’s efficient introduction sets the stage for the reader by
briefly examining key historical events associated with varying degrees of
religious and ethnic tolerance levels in the United States from 1920 to 1960.
The introduction captures the reader emotionally by first telling the story of
the Four Immortal Chaplains, each of a different religion, who collectively
died together linking their arms and giving away their life vests during the
sinking of the Dorchestor in 1943, and describing the country’s many tributes
and memorials that commemorated their sacrifice. The introduction discusses
how the book will examine the nation’s and the military’s views of ethnic and
religious tolerance beginning with WWI through the inter-war years leading
to WWII, events associated with WWII, and finally post-WWII through the
Cold War. The two seminal events the author vividly described that bookend
this 40-year time period were the 1928 resounding defeat of the nation’s first
Catholic Presidential Candidate, Al Smith, versus the 1960 election of John
Kennedy, the nation’s first Catholic President, and how the nation’s collective
religious and ethnic tolerance greatly differed in two Presidential campaigns.
To appreciate the author’s white, ethnic, and religious focus, a brief
summary of key statistics discussed in the book about the nation’s diversity
is warranted. Prior to WWII, more than 25 percent of the nation’s population,
approximately 35 million (M), were first and second-generation Americans. Of
this total, the largest numbers were Germans (5M), Italians (4M), Polish (3M)
and Irish (2.5M) with Czechs, Hungarians, Swedes, Norwegians and Mexicans
approximately 1 million each. The nation’s estimated religious percentages
included Roman Catholics as the largest denomination at 30 percent, followed
in percentage order by Baptists (16), Methodists (11), Lutherans (7), Jewish
(4), and Presbyterians (4), among the 60 different religions. The issue of racial
segregation of people of Black and Asian color was not discussed in any detail.
The author acknowledged, however, that an opportunity was wasted, as white
soldiers did not have their views challenged from training, boredom, or combat
experiences with people of color.
The book’s first two chapters, aptly titled, “The America They Left
Behind” and “The Ethnic Army,” provide the intellectual and somewhat analytical
basis for the later chapters focused on WWII’s impact. The first chapter broadly
examines the nation’s religious and ethnically intolerant character illustrated
by the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, religious bias associated with Smith’s run for
president, work force discrimination issues, immigration and prohibition laws,
and the development of ethnic in the nation’s cities and countryside. The book’s
vignettes, describing degrees of ethnic and religious intolerances and blatant
biases, were much more powerful than the statistics. As WWII recruiting and
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the draft reflected the nation’s ethnic and religious percentages, they combined
with the associated intolerance, the author establishing context that reveals the
challenges facing the Army and its predominant Protestant Chaplain Corps.
The next three chapters—“Introduction to the Army, Hours of Boredom”
and “Instants of Excitement and Terror”—capture ways the Army dealt with
this diversity. The author describes how the Army “literally stripped down the
recruits to their essentials” through induction processes, close quarters, and a
tough physical regimen. This was followed by developing individuals in teams
from initial training and stateside service that slowly allowed soldiers to see
themselves and their cohorts differently. The author provides examples of how
Army leaders did not ignore ethnic and religious issues and purposely enacted
policies to unite individuals with a pragmatism and idealism through the
effective use of print and motion picture media. The insight on how boredom
enabled soldiers to deeply bond as they developed friendships across ethnic and
religious barriers that lasted well beyond service was important and informative
because most earlier works dealt with bonding through combat. The chapter
on combat captured a different intensity as it illustrated how soldiers dealt
with anxieties, formed brotherhoods, and embraced prayer in a foxhole. The
vignettes depict how performance and the resultant comradeship helped to set
aside negative ethnic and religious beliefs.
The final two chapters—“Coming Home, Taking Over” and “The New
Consensus and Beyond”—followed by a succinct conclusion provides insight
on how WWII veterans were welcomed home but not necessarily reintegrated
into their neighborhoods. A key point was that many veterans did not go back to
their ethnic neighborhoods or farm communities. Instead, they traveled across
America and developed what is now called the suburbs, with greater ethnic
and religious diversity. The GI Bill fostered home ownership and education
opportunities for returning veterans in record numbers and helped ensure
the nation’s economic and intellectual growth. Most importantly, the author
identifies how Americans in general began to listen more to these veterans’
views in word and deed. Bruscino traces the veterans’ political influence in
Congress as well as their startling, positive social advocacy roles and growth in
inter-ethnic and inter-faith marriages.
The book’s strength is the effective manner in which it efficiently
describes the social and political events, and the statistical data supporting
the various vignettes, all designed to capture the reader analytically and
emotionally. The extensive bibliography and over 75 pages of endnotes provide
the intellectual rigor to support the author’s views while giving the reader
excellent sources for further research. The book’s one weakness is that it should
have discussed racial segregation in more detail, as well as integrating Marine
and Naval anecdotes and statistics. One can certainly learn from historic events,
the author’s insight provides the everyday citizen and nation’s leaders ways to
think about and address some of the ongoing religious and ethnic challenges.
Growing up as the child of a second-generation American and World War
II veteran from a Catholic Hungarian neighborhood in a diverse ethnic and
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religious Pennsylvania city, this allowed the reviewer to connect with many
of the author’s revelations. If this book is any indication of the quality of the
Legacies of War series, look forward to the upcoming releases.

The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and
Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity
Courtesy of Columbia Univ. Press

by Antoine Bousquet
Reviewed by Kevin J. Cogan, COL (USA Retired), a
former General Broehon Burke Somervell Chair of
Management, US Army War College

I

f you like neither science nor military history, stop here
and skip to another review. If you are still here, then
New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 2009
first there is a little test: Jomini, Sun Tzu, von Moltke,
Clausewitz, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Boyd, Gell288 pages
Mann, Chomsky, Gödel, Mandelbrot, von Neumann,
$45.00
Lorenz, Schrödinger, and Shannon. If you are comfortable
with the first six or seven names but started to fade with the latter names on the
list, then reading this book will not extend your knowledge of warfare, but you
will learn more about science. And if you were comfortable with the last half of
the name list but not the beginning, then you will enhance your military acumen
when reading this book. And if you are familiar with all the names on the list,
you are not as likely to learn more about science or warfare, but rather you will
modify your view of the world and its future in both domains.
The author organizes his book not by date, but around metaphors to
describe modern battlefields: the clock for the mechanistic warfare era, the
engine to introduce thermodynamic war, the computer to express cybernetic
warfare, and the network to reveal the future vision for chaoplexic warfare. The
reader is fortunate to have a common familiarity with the clock, the engine, the
computer, and (maybe) the network (network in the sense of social networking,
not routers and servers). From this familiarity, it is easy to see the impact that
science has on warfare, not from a technical sense, but rather in the cultural
way that society adopts its new technology and then manifests its acceptance
of it throughout society including warfare. There are two primary points that
the author makes: first, society has to eventually accept the new technology
where acceptance is the internalization in everyday life of the science that has
been wrought; second, with attribution to Alvin Tofler, “nations make war the
same way they make wealth.” This latter point is expressed somewhat late
in the book and the reader is left wondering when the philosophical underpinnings will emerge, and when they do, he finds that Bouquet’s sentiments
toward the United States are not very flattering. Be that as it may, it is amusing
to associate the clockworks of the 16th century with the mechanistic way of
war—structured, organized, precise, cause and effect. Armies march in step,
obey predetermined orders, obey the “clockmaker” and hope that it worked
when the smoke cleared.
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The emergence of the science of the engine, which transformed society as
it entered and accepted the new industrial age, also transformed waging war with
entropy, ballistics, and motors which define the thermodynamic era of warfare.
Most notably, this era heightened destruction produced by more energetic
weapons (to include nuclear) and eliminated any predictability that might have
been assumed in the mechanistic (clock) era. The author injects Clausewitz’s
“fog of war” concept in the thermodynamic era but will also return to it when the
cybernetic era is presented. The cybernetic way of warfare is delineated as postHiroshima which unleashed the most energetic means of war to that date. It was
thought that cybernetics could either deter or control nuclear war with the new
weapons of command and control, communications, computers (von Neumann),
operations research/systems analysis, information theory (Shannon), and chaos
theory (Gödel, Mandelbrot). The cybernetic way of warfare ushered in the belief
that information was the opposite of entropy (thermodynamic warfare) and thus
the probability of vast destruction could be controlled through robust command
and control networks such as the World Wide Military Command and Control
System (WWMCCS) and other similar references.
With another stroke of disparagement towards the United States in the
application of cybernetics in Vietnam, the notion of nonlinearity (chaos theory)
and its mathematical underpinnings are introduced to state why low-intensity
conflict is such a difficult task. Indeed, society widely accepted the computer
in the last decade of the 20th century. Its adaptation to warfare had hoped to
find order in disorder. Now enter chaos theory, complex adaptive systems,
decentralization of command, and network centric warfare. Reenter Clausewitz
and the fog of war as well as his friction in war. The author neatly marries
Clausewitz’s “friction” with chaos theory’s “butterfly effect” of Lorenz which
both essentially state that small disturbances in the initial conditions can have
a great effect on the outcome.
At about this point the reader may have been fairly comfortable with
the clock, engine, and computer metaphors for the scientific way of warfare.
After all, at the dawn of the 21st century, these metaphors have been common
societal and culturally accepted experiences for most. But the last metaphor,
the network, is used to describe the emerging (and not yet accepted) chaoplexic
way of warfare. Now the reader might say “I really don’t want to read this
anymore” but is committed to finish with only 80 pages to go. Here, physicist
Murray Gell-Mann states that complexity, defined as “the edge of chaos,” is at
its maximum between the extremities of order and disorder. At this “edge” the
author will show that positive feedback in decentralized and distributed networks will yield structures that are at their peak adaptability and creativeness.
The warfighter reader might translate this to mean that the soldier immersed
in the fog of war at the edge of the command and control system will emerge
as the best decisionmaker. This is the antithesis of the clock metaphor, the
earliest era of modern warfare presented in the book. But the notions of nonlinearity, complexity science, and self-adapting networks are not yet intuitive to
most readers not to mention societal acceptance which was earlier stated to be
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necessary for adaptation of new science to warfare and a manifestation of the
way nations make wealth.
Although choaplexic warfare may yet seem far off, reading about its
possibilities, with the book’s ample references to other texts, may be a fertile
launch point for further independent research for both the military-minded and
scientific-oriented readers. This was a good place to end the book. Unfortunately,
the author regresses by trying to integrate Gell-Mann, John Boyd’s Observe,
Orient, Desicd, and Act (OODA) loop in great detail, and an emerging “choaplexic Clausewitz” by stamping it with quotes from the US Marine Corps’
FMFM1: Warfighting manual. The real purpose of this last chapter, as this
review alluded to earlier, is to denigrate the US adoption of Network Centric
Warfare, also known internationally as NATO Network Enabled Capability
(NNEC). Some may welcome this, but it really is an unnecessary political discourse and detracts from the otherwise excellent science/war dynamic of the
book’s stated intent. The first three metaphors effectively integrate science and
warfare as a duality for each of the modern warfare eras. The last era, chaoplexic warfare, has yet to unfold and should have enjoyed greater elaboration in
that chapter. If it had, the reader would recognize that each era of warfare was
followed by accelerated adoption and societal acceptance of a new science and
that chaoplexic warfare may be here faster than currently imagined.

Global Security Watch: Jordan

Courtesy of Praeger

by W. Andrew Terrill
Reviewed by Colonel Robert E. Friedenberg, currently
serving as Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché,
US Embassy Damascus, Syria

J

ordan is a poor Arab country with few natural resources,
no oil, and a small population, yet its strategic importance has outweighed its lack of attributes. How have the
Santa Barbara, CA:
Praeger, 2010
Jordanians achieved this? Will Jordan remain strategically
relevant to the United States following combat operations
187 pages
in Iraq, Jordan’s neighbor to the East?
$49.95
Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, a research professor at the
US Army War College, attempts to answer these questions in this book. Well
researched and clearly written, his book begins with an overview of Jordanian
history, effectively combining both older sources and very recent ones. Weaving
a narrative from current King Abdullah II’s grandfather, Abdullah I, to his father,
Hussein, to the present day, Terrill shows how the earlier monarchs managed
threats, balanced competing interests and maintained alliances. Following a
chapter on Jordanian political, economic, and military systems, Terrill then
goes into detail on Jordanian relations with the Palestinians, the United States,
Israel, its Arab neighbors, and Iran. It is here that the author’s strengths as a historian of the region come into focus. Dr Terrill has written in the past on King
Hussein’s rivalry with Yasir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization
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(PLO), and his expertise in this area is useful in his interpretation of the March
1968 Battle of Karameh. This was an inconclusive military action fought on
Jordanian territory between the Israelis and a combined PLO/Jordanian Army
force. Terrill correctly notes, however, that Palestinian propagandists labeled
it as a huge defeat for Israel and the battle became a key element in Arafat’s
warrior mythology.
Terrill’s knowledge of wider Middle Eastern history also allows him to
place Jordan’s current relations with its neighbors into historic context. In the
case of Iraq, he covers the earlier close relations that, following Jordan’s refusal
to abandon Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 Gulf War, a move that severely
isolated King Hussein. Jordanian-Iraqi relations were much more strained
following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam and the rise of a Shia-dominated government in Iraq. But as Terrill points out, relations are always more complicated
than at first glance. Jordan is currently assisting Iraqi police and military training, and continues importing Iraqi oil. The historic ties remain, despite some
difficulties. The author answers the question of Jordan’s continuing strategic
relevance in chapters on Jordan’s relations with its neighbors, the United States,
and Israel. Following the 1991 Gulf War, King Hussein knew he had to get back
in the good graces of the United States, and so concluded a peace treaty with
Israel, thus ensuring US economic and military assistance. Abdullah, taking a
page from his father’s playbook, continued to remain vital to the United States
by joining the “Global War On Terror” following the 11 September 2001 attacks
and assisting the United States in the subsequent invasion of Iraq. Where there
may have been some risk to this strategy in terms of Abdullah’s domestic
popularity, Terrill shows us that, with the November 2005 bombings of three
Western chain hotels in Amman, al Qaeda overplayed its hand and Jordanian
public opinion turned decisively against Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born al Qaeda leader. In his chapter on how Jordan
deals with terrorism, Terrill includes the “Amman Message,” a sermon delivered in 2004 by the Jordanian Chief Justice that formalized Jordan’s attempt
to advance moderate Islam and counter those voices that labeled all Muslims
as extremists. He sees the sermon not as a single event, but as part of a larger
effort by the government to counter Islamic extremism. Once again, he finds the
larger context that eludes many observers of the Middle East.
In a final chapter entitled “Jordan Looks Toward the Future,” the author
clearly explains how Jordan must remain relevant to a host of international
power brokers—the United States needs Jordan to maintain peace with Israel
and set the example for those Arab nations that have yet to conclude agreements
with the Jewish State. Jordan’s ability to affect Iraqi stability in ways such as
continuing to train Iraqi security forces, is also vital. In the struggle against
terrorism and Islamic extremism, Jordan’s position and influence overshadow
its limited population and resources. Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate,
though sometimes accused of brutal methods, is critical in cooperating with
the United States in the fight against al Qaeda and related organizations. In
advancing the Amman Message, Jordanian “soft power” can counter more
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extremist and intolerant versions of Islam. In the final chapter, Terrill has
advice for US policy makers. A pro-democracy agenda must be tempered with
the desire for stability. He states free elections in Jordan will not necessarily
produce pro-American, pro-Israeli governments. It is here that perhaps Terrill’s
advocacy of the Realpolitik view may be out of step with recent events. The
January 2011 riots in Tunis show us that overdependence on autocratic regimes
to maintain stability can backfire. The United States will continue to depend
on Jordan for stability, but needs to be aware of growing frustration among its
overwhelmingly young population facing increasing unemployment and higher
costs of living. The Hashemite family has shown an amazing ability to counter
threats to its rule—the increasing frustration of the population is just the latest
challenge to stability in Jordan. Some reform is inevitable if the Hashemite
Kingdom is to survive.
At the end of the book are several useful appendixes including biographies of Jordanian leaders, the full transcript of the Amman Message, and an
address by King Abdullah II to a joint session of the US Congress.
This very readable book is strongly recommended for those in uniform
and civilians with Middle East-related assignments.

Battlespace Technologies: Network-Enabled
Information Dominance
by Richard S. Deakin
Reviewed by Dr. Jeffrey L. Groh, Professor, Information
and Technology in Warfare, US Army War College

I

t is a challenge to stay current on information systems and
communications technologies in 21st century warfare.
The understanding of information-age technologies can be
510 pages
intimidating to senior warfighters and their staffs. Trade
$125.10
journals, internet resources, and technical white papers
can heighten the angst to gain an appreciation for the available technologies to prosecute information-age warfare. Richard S. Deakin in
his book Battlespace Technologies: Network-Enabled Information Dominance
provides a valuable service putting the most important networking concepts,
information systems, and communications equipment in one reference. Deakin
argues, early in the book, that information-age technologies have significant
implications for command and control within the operational environment.
This thesis should grab the attention of senior warfighters and their staffs as a
guide to the concepts and tools required to successfully operate in a networkenabled environment.
The central theme advances the concept of Network-Enabled Capability
(NEC). The author describes NEC as an “integrated force approach to modern
warfare enabled by the cohesion of communications and computer networks,
sensors, intelligence-gathering assets, and databases integrated with the
Boston: Artech
House Publishers,
2010
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necessary command and control (C2) processes.” The book begins with a brief
introduction outlining the significant changes to warfare in the 21st century.
He examines the myths and realities of network warfare as well as how militaries gain information superiority on the modern battlefield. In the next two
chapters, the author examines the principles and evolution of Network-Enabled
Warfare as well as essential NEC concepts. The reader gains an appreciation for
the value added by collaborative sensing, tracking, targeting, and engagement
to achieve desired effects in today’s operational environment. The following
chapter provides the reader a detailed examination of the most current NEC
techniques and technologies. This part of the book is an extremely technical
analysis that may be difficult for those who find network theory, hardware, and
software discussion intimidating. Over 400 colored photographs and illustrations clearly demonstrate concepts and equipment for those who do not have a
background in information technology or communications. The author writes
in language that most will understand and clearly explains central concepts.
The final chapter is a brief presentation of future trends in NEC. The future will
continue to see advances in networking and sensors. There will be an integration of systems assisting planners to harness even more data and information
facilitating situational understanding.
The author provides value on many levels when contemplating the complexities of warfare today. He advances the notion of Network Centric Warfare
beyond the ideas proffered by John Garstka, Frederick P. Stein, and Dr. David
S. Alberts in their book (Network Centric Warfare: Developing and leveraging
Information Superiority, 2nd Revised Edition, Washington, DC: CCRP, 1999).
The term “Network Centric Warfare” has acquired a great deal of conceptual
baggage over the years. Through the book, Deakin works to demonstrate that
the network is an enabler to the warfighter in 21st century warfare. “To refer to
network technologies as network-centric is therefore misleading. Network technologies have created quite the opposite effect of delivering decision making
right across the network rather than centralizing it as the term would suggest.”
Deakin stresses that network-enabled capabilities are more about networking
than the network. This important distinction places information systems and
communications in the proper context of information-age warfare. He also
clearly articulates throughout the book that NEC is not a “panacea” to address
all the challenges facing military leaders. The vulnerabilities of military forces
tied to robust information systems and communications play a central role.
Deakin covers in considerable detail the problems of information overload, over
dependency on data, cyber attacks, and the basic complexity of today’s systems.
He goes beyond technological buzzwords to examine concepts in depth.
One should not expect to read this book like a novel. Deakin provides
a reference (dare I say encyclopedia) of current information systems and
communications technologies along with the associated network theory. This
should not dissuade senior leaders from making this a part of their professional
reading. Leaders at all levels require understanding of the command and control
theories and equipment that enable 21st century warfare. Deakin leverages an
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impressive array of the most current scholarly and technical publications as
well as military doctrine adding validity and rigor to the book.
The one minor shortcoming is the book’s focus on major combat operations. There is little coverage on how information systems and communications
can enable operations in hybrid and irregular warfare environments. The author
offers almost no analysis on the challenges to command and control in an
interagency and intergovernmental operational environment. The book focuses
mostly on UK, US, and NATO doctrine in major combat operations; the reader
must extrapolate these lessons learned to an irregular operational environment
characteristic of many of today’s conflicts.
This book is worthy of the attention of senior military leaders and their
staffs responsible for planning and executing 21st century warfare at the operational and strategic levels of war. This work offers value to more than information
systems and communications specialists. It is relevant to commanders and operations planners (i.e., J-3 and J-5s). The technologies described in this extensive
work will continue to remain a central element of military information systems
for years to come. It helps the reader understand the complexity of the hardware
and software in today’s military networks. The author clearly outlines the relationships between sensor, shooter, and decisionmaker in the context of the “kill
chain” on today’s modern battlefield.
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